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1Abstract
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the
designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communi-
cation networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and
beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is implementable. We
show that any incentive compatible social choice function is implementable on
a given communication network, in all environments with either common inde-
pendent beliefs and private values or a worst outcome, if and only if the network
is strongly connected and weakly 2-connected. A network is strongly connected
if for each player, there exists a directed path to the designer. It is weakly 2-
connected if each player is either directly connected to the designer or indirectly
connected to the designer through two disjoint paths, not necessarily directed.
We couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure
the transmission of each player’s private information to the designer.
Keywords: Mechanism design, incentives, Bayesian equilibrium, communi-
cation networks, encryption, secure transmission.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C72, D82.
21 Introduction
1.1 Overview and motivations
The revelation principle is the cornerstone of mechanism design and its applications.
It asserts that the outcome of any communication system can be replicated by a di-
rect revelation mechanism, in which agents directly and privately communicate with
a designer, and truthfully report all their information (Gibbard (1973), Dasgupta,
Hammond and Maskin (1979), Myerson (1979), Harris and Townsend (1981), Myer-
son (1982)). As a technical result, the revelation principle is a blessing. It allows to
abstract away from the very details of communication systems and to focus on the
social choice functions to be implemented. At the same time, it is slightly disturbing,
as it implies that no decentralized communication system, however sophisticated, can
dominate the centralized (direct) communication system. Yet, real-world organizations
seldom take the form of centralized communication systems. The aim of this paper is
to characterize the communication systems which replicate the incentive properties of
centralized communication and thus, to show that incentive considerations alone can
already explain the existence of a large variety of real-world organizations.1
Communication systems are naturally modeled as directed networks (graphs), in
which the nodes represent the players and the designer. A player can directly commu-
nicate with another player if there exists a directed edge from that player to the other.
We then associate communication networks with social environments representing the
preferences and beliefs of the players, and characterize the topology of communica-
tion networks for which, in any environment, every incentive compatible social choice
function is implementable.
The connectivity of communication networks is at the center of our analysis. A
directed network is strongly 1-connected if for each player, there exists a directed path
from this player to the designer. This is a minimal requirement that ensures that the
designer may receive information from each player. A directed network is weakly 2-
connected if each player i is either directly connected to the designer or has two disjoint
1There is a recent literature labeled as algorithmic mechanism design, that focuses on communica-
tion complexity and mechanism design (see Nisan et al. (2007) for an excellent exposition and Nisan
and Segal (2006) and Van Zandt (2007) for economic applications.) Unlike this literature, we abstract
from complexity considerations and entirely focus on incentives.
3paths to the designer in the associated undirected graph. Figure 1 gives two examples
of weakly 2-connected networks with a hierarchical structure. Our analysis shows that
in a large class of environments, both networks have the very same incentive properties.
Thus, other features, e.g. span of control, are needed to discriminate among them. We
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Figure 1: Two communication networks (hierarchies)
Our ﬁrst main result states that any incentive compatible social choice function
is implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with com-
mon independent beliefs and private values, if and only if the network is weakly 2-
connected and strongly 1-connected.(In the sequel, we omit the condition of strong
1-connectedness.) The intuition for this result is as follows. A social choice func-
tion is (Bayesian) incentive compatible if, when each player expects the others to tell
the truth, then no player has an incentive to lie about his own private information.
Importantly, players use their prior beliefs to form their expectations. However, in
a general communication network, players receive messages from their neighbors and
thus, their incentives to tell the truth may be altered (since their posterior beliefs
may diﬀer from their prior beliefs). To circumvent this problem, we couple encryption
techniques and incentives to transfer “securely” each player’s private information to
the designer through the network. Our encoding technique guarantees that no player
learns anything about the types of the other players and therefore, posterior beliefs are
equal to prior beliefs. To illustrate, assume that the network is strongly 2-connected,
that is, each player is either directly connected to the designer or has two disjoint
directed paths of communication to the designer. A player can thus send a private
“encoding” key to the designer through one path and his type encoded with the key,
4a “cypher-type,” through the other (disjoint) path. However, this is not suﬃcient:
players must also have an incentive to truthfully forward the messages they receive.
Our technique guarantees furthermore that a player’s expected payoﬀ is independent
of the messages he forwards and therefore, has an incentive to truthfully forward the
messages of their neighbors. Incentive compatibility ensures that players also have an
incentive to truthfully report their own private information.
In this construction, the encoding technique is tailored to a given common and in-
dependent prior and cannot be generalized without this assumption. To accommodate
more general beliefs, we resort to a diﬀerent encoding technique which “authenticates”
the player’s messages in that if a player does not truthfully forward the messages of his
neighbors, the deviation is detected with arbitrarily high probability. In environments
with a worst outcome, the threat to be punished upon detection of a false report deters
players from lying about the messages of their neighbors. Again, incentive compatibil-
ity ensures that players also have an incentive to truthfully report their own private
information. This is our second main result.2
We now oﬀer some motivations for our study. Firstly, as in Bolton and Dewa-
tripont (1994), we implicitly assume that the communication network (the internal
organization of the ﬁrm) is established in a prior stage and that it is relatively costly
to modify. Consequently, if the designer is uncertain about which incentive compati-
ble social choice functions he will actually have to implement, it is optimal to choose
a network in the class of weakly 2-connected networks. Alternatively, we can think
of our study as a worst-case analysis: If the communication network is not weakly
2-connected, there exist incentive compatible social choice functions that cannot be
implemented on that network. Secondly, the previous discussion suggests that the cost
of forming a link between any two agents is an important determinant in choosing
among diﬀerent networks (organizations). How costly is it to form such a link? To
answer this question, we need to carefully interpret what a link is in our model. A
link between two agents is a perfectly secure channel of communication, i.e., no other
agent can eavesdrop, alter or intercept messages sent over the link, and any message
sent is received with certainty. Private face-to-face communication is probably the
closest instance of such perfectly secure communication in real life.3 Such links are
2To the best of our knowledge, the authentication method we use is new.
3E-mails, phone calls or text messages are not examples of perfectly secure and reliable channels
5relatively costly to establish as argued by computer scientists, see e.g., Beimel and
Franklin (1999). Furthermore, Friebel and Raith (2004) argue that even if it were
possible to create at no cost such perfectly secure communication links between each
agent and the designer in an organization, it may not be optimal to do so. In their
words, “requiring intra-ﬁrm communication to pass through a “chain of command” can
be an eﬀective way of securing the incentives for superiors to recruit and develop the
best possible subordinates.”
Related literature. The computer science literature on secure transmission of
messages is closely related to this paper. Section 3.3 provides an in-depth discussion
of this literature and its relationships to our study. The paper most closely related
to our work is Monderer and Tennenholtz (1999), who study a similar problem to
ours. Our paper substantially generalizes their results in several dimensions. Firstly,
these authors consider undirected networks and environments with a worst outcome,
common independent beliefs and private values. They show that 2-connectedness of
the network is a suﬃcient condition for the implementation of all incentive compati-
ble social choice functions. Crucially, in their model, edges are not directed and thus
can be used to communicate in both directions. It follows that the 2-connectedness
of the undirected network guarantees the existence of directed sub-networks that are
strongly 2-connected. Their protocol (mechanisms and strategies) heavily exploits this
fact and indeed breaks down if the undirected network does not have an underlying
strongly 2-connected network. We show that in environments with common inde-
pendent beliefs and private values, weak 2-connectedness, a weaker requirement than
strong 2-connectedness, is a necessary and suﬃcient condition (the assumption of a
worst outcome is superﬂuous). Secondly, we show that in environments with a worst
outcome, weak 2-connectedness is again a necessary and suﬃcient condition; no further
assumption on the environment is needed. We need to resort to diﬀerent encryption
techniques than the ones used in Monderer and Tennenholtz (1999), which would fail
without common independent beliefs even on strongly 2-connected networks. Further-
more, with the very same techniques, we show that strong 3-connectedness is a suﬃcient
condition for the implementation of all incentive compatible social choice functions in
all environments. Again, the techniques of Monderer and Tennenholtz (1999) would
of communication as the recent scandal News of the World demonstrates (Guardian, 14 July 2009).
In fact, if they were, there would be no need for encryption devices.
6fail here.
1.2 A simple example
We now illustrate our main results within the context of a simple example. There are
three players, labeled 1, 2 and 3, two types for player 2, labeled θ and θ′, and two
alternatives a and b. Player 2’s preferences over these alternatives depend on his type
(in all examples, preferences are strict). Player 2 prefers a to b if his type is θ and
prefers b to a if his type is θ′. Player 1 always prefers a to b, while player 3 always
prefers b to a. The designer aims at implementing the social choice function f∗ that
selects the preferred alternative of player 2 for each of his type: player 2 is dictatorial.
If player 2 can securely and directly communicate with the designer, f∗ is clearly
implementable: the designer can simply ask player 2 to directly report his preferred
alternative. Suppose now that player 2 cannot directly communicate with the designer





Figure 2: Communication network N2
With the communication network N2, player 2 can indirectly communicate with the
designer through player 1. Moreover, player 3 has two disjoint paths of communication
to the designer with player 2 on one of them. Consequently, player 2 has two disjoint
paths to the designer, but one of them is not directed. The network N2 is thus weakly
2-connected. The idea is then to use the two disjoint paths from 3 to 0 to secure the
communication of player 2’s type to the designer, without revealing information to the
other players. So, suppose that players 1 and 3 believe that player 2’s type is θ with
probability 1/3, independently of their own types. The goal is to design a mechanism
and an equilibrium such that the designer implements a in state θ and b in state θ′.
The mechanism allows player 3 to send a real number in [0,1) to player 2 and
another real number in [0,1) to player 0. Similarly, player 2 (resp., player 1) can
7send a real number in [0,1) to player 1 (resp., player 0). An informal description of
the strategies is as follows. Independently of his type, player 3 draws an “encoding
key” y uniformly on [0,1) and sends it to both players 0 and 2. Player 2 of type θ
(resp., θ′) draws a “pseudo-type” ˜ x uniformly on [0,1/3) (resp., [1/3,1)). The pseudo-
type thus “reveals” θ, but its unconditional distribution is uniform on [0,1).4 Then,
player 2 encodes his pseudo-type ˜ x with the encoding key y received from player 3 to
obtain the “cypher-type” x = (˜ x + y)mod0,1.5 Player 2 sends x to player 1. Player
1 has to correctly forward the message of player 2 to the designer. Let (ˆ x, ˆ y) be a
pair of messages received by the designer. The allocation rule is the following: If
(ˆ x − ˆ y)mod0,1 ∈ [0,1/3), the designer implements a and implements b, otherwise.
If the players follow the prescribed strategies, ˆ y = y, ˆ x = x and (ˆ x− ˆ y)mod0,1 = ˜ x.
Thus, the designer correctly learns player 2’s type and implements the desired social
choice function f∗. In particular, players 1 and 3 expect the designer to implement
a with probability 1/3 and b with probability 2/3. We now show that the players do
not have an incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategies. Suppose that player 1
deviates and sends a message ˆ x to the designer instead of x. The designer implements
the alternative a if (ˆ x − y)mod0,1 ∈ [0,1/3) and b, otherwise. Since y is uniformly
distributed, so is (ˆ x − y)mod0,1 (see Lemma 2 in Appendix). Accordingly, player 1
expects the designer to implement a with probability 1/3 and b with probability 2/3.
Thus, player 1’s expected payoﬀ does not depend on the message ˆ x that he sends.
Player 1 has therefore no incentive to deviate. A similar argument applies to player 3.
As for player 2, he has no incentive to deviate since f∗ is incentive compatible.
It is worth stressing that the essential feature of the network is its weak 2-connectedness.
For instance, if in addition to the links shown in Figure 2, player 3 has a link to player
1, the result remains valid (the network remains weakly 2-connected). Indeed, we can
construct a “babbling equilibrium” in which player 3 sends an uninformative message
to player 1, and player 1 plays independently of player 3’s message. Alternatively, and
more simply, we may let the message space from player 3 to player 1 be a singleton.
In eﬀect, we show that the weak 2-connectedness of the network is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the implementation of any incentive compatible social choice
4More precisely, denote U[0,1/3) (resp., U[1/3,1)) the uniform distribution on [0,1/3) (resp., [1/3,1)).
The unconditional distribution of ˜ x is 1
3U[0,1/3) + 2
3U[1/3,1) = U[0,1), the uniform distribution on [0,1).
5For a real number r, rmod0,1 = r − ⌊r⌋, with ⌊r⌋ the highest integer less or equal to r.
8functions in environments with independent common beliefs and private values.
A further and important feature of the proposed mechanism and strategies is that
players 1 and 3 learn nothing about player 2’s type. This is clearly true for player 3 as
he does not receive a message from player 2. As for player 1, we prove that the message
x (the cypher-type) he receives is uniformly distributed on [0,1) and independent of
player 2’s type. This feature is crucial for the implementation of incentive compatible
social choice functions which depend on the private information of all players. It guar-
antees that posterior beliefs are equal to prior beliefs and consequently, that players’
incentives to truthfully reveal their own private information are not altered.
Another important aspect is that the mechanism and strategies are tailored to envi-
ronments with common independent beliefs and private values. Firstly, the partition of
[0,1) into {[0,1/3),[1/3,1)} is such that the Lebesgue measure of each subset exactly
matches the common prior beliefs of players 1 and 3. This allows the unconditional
distribution of the pseudo-type to be uniform. By contrast, suppose that player 1
believes that player 2’s type is θ with probability 2/3. With the above strategies,
player 1 expects the designer to decode player 3’s type as being θ with probability
1/3, which is diﬀerent from his prior belief 2/3. Consequently, player 1’s incentive to
truthfully report his private information might be altered.6 Secondly, to understand
the importance of the private value assumption, suppose that player 1 prefers b to a
when player 2’s type is θ and a to b when player 2’s type is θ′ (interdependent values).
If player 1 truthfully forwards the message x he received from player 2, the alternative
a is implemented if and only if player 2’s type is θ and the alternative b is implemented
if and only if player 2’s type is θ′. However, if he sends a message ˆ x independently of
the message received from 2, both alternatives a and b are implemented with positive
probability, regardless of player 2’s type, a proﬁtable deviation for player 1. In sum,
the problem with more general environments is not only to guarantee that no informa-
tion is revealed, but to provide players with incentives to truthfully communicate their
private information and the messages they receive.
6For instance, take Θ1 = Θ2 = {θ,θ′}, three alternatives a, b, c, and u1(a,θ) = 3/2, u1(b,θ) = 1
and u1(c,θ) = 0. Consider the social choice function f which depends only on players 1 and 2’s types
with f(θ,θ) = a, f(θ′,θ) = f(θ,θ′) = c and f(θ′,θ′) = b. This is incentive compatible for player 1 at
state θ when he believes that player 2’s type is θ with probability 2/3, but not when he believes that
player 2’s type is θ with probability 1/3.
9With more elaborated encryption techniques, our result remain valid in environ-
ments with a worst alternative (Theorem 2). The intuition is as follows. Consider
again the network N2. Player 3 draws a large number of independent encoding keys
y1,...,yη and send them to players 0 and 2. Player 2 privately chooses one of these keys
(with equiprobability) and uses it to encrypt his type. He then sends to player 1 the
encrypted type and the unused keys, without telling him which key was used for cod-
ing. Player 1 has to correctly forward player 2’s message to the designer. The designer
compares the two vectors he receives. If these vectors diﬀer by exactly one component
η∗, he infers that the key yη∗ transmitted by player 3 was used for coding, and decodes
player 2’s type accordingly. Otherwise, the designer implements the worst alternative.
This encoding technique guarantees that players 1 and 3 learn nothing about player
2’s type and allows the designer to detect unilateral deviations with arbitrarily high
probability, since the index η∗ is the private information of player 2. In turn, the threat
to implement the worst alternative upon detection of a deviation deters players from
deviating.
To conclude, we preview some secondary aspects of our analysis. Firstly, the use
of probabilistic coding implies that our equilibria are in mixed strategies. This point
is crucial as the social choice function f∗ in our example is not implementable in pure
equilibria. Section 4.2 elaborates on this issue. Secondly, unlike the computer science
literature, our encoding technique relies on transmitting real numbers, which may not
have a ﬁnite binary expansion. This choice is well in accordance with the implementa-
tion literature: a social choice function is implementable if there exists a mechanism,
possibly with continuous action spaces, and an equilibrium which corresponds to the
social choice function at each state. With some modiﬁcations, our main results can be
obtained with ﬁnite message spaces (see Section 3).
1.3 Applications
Our study has several implications for the optimal design of organizations (see Mookher-
jee (2009) for a survey). Indeed, we show that all weakly 2-connected networks have
the very same incentive properties and thus, cannot be discriminated according to that
property. So, which of the several weakly 2-connected networks (or hierarchies) should
the designer choose?
10Following Williamson (1967) and Calvo and Wellisz (1978), we may discriminate
hierarchies according to their span of control, i.e., the number of subordinates that any
manager can supervise. In a 1-layer hierarchy (the direct communication network), the
designer has to directly supervise all of his employees, i.e., his span of control is the
entire workforce. Alternatively, within the class of weakly 2-connected networks, there
exists a network whereby the designer supervises two employees and each employee
supervises a single other employee. The span of control of each manager is thus at
most two. We call this network the n∗-layer hierarchy.7 See Figure 1 for an example
with n∗ = 3. Now, if the span of control to any manager is limited (due to limited
time, attention, or resources), control losses arise: information transmitted through the
hierarchy might be distorted. However, as both networks have the very same incentive
properties (i.e., any information the designer would have received in a 1-layer hierarchy
is also received in a n∗-layer hierarchy), the n∗-layer hierarchy dominates the 1-layer
hierarchy in that it minimizes the span of control of each manager, while retaining the
same incentive properties.
Another distinctive mark of hierarchies is their costs of communication and in-
formation processing. For instance, in Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), the internal
organization of the ﬁrm is seen as a communication network resulting from the trade-
oﬀ between specialization in information processing and the cost of communication
required to coordinate the activities of the ﬁrm.8 They show that the eﬃcient net-
works are pyramidal hierarchies, where each agent sends his information to at most
one other agent and a unique agent (the designer) receives all the processed informa-
tion. (See Radner (1993) for similar results.) Within the class of weakly 2-connected
networks, only the 1-layer hierarchy is a pyramidal hierarchy. The workload of the
designer in a 1-layer hierarchy is abyssal, however: he has to read the reports of all
his subordinates and process all their informational contents. So, if the designer has
limited resources to devote to this task, this is likely to be infeasible in practice. While
there is no other pyramidal hierarchy in the class of weakly 2-connected networks, the
n∗-layer hierarchy is almost pyramidal: all agents but one (the agent at the bottom)
send their information to a unique superior and the designer has to process the in-
formation of only two subordinates. However, our construction requires the designer
7n∗ = (n + 1)/2 if n is odd and n∗ = (n + 2)/2 if n is even.
8Note that they abstract away from incentive considerations.
11to process twice many messages. As in Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), suppose that
there is a ﬁxed cost λ to connect the designer with a subordinate and a variable cost a
per message processed. The total communication cost to the designer is then n(λ+a)
with the 1-layer hierarchy and 2λ + (2n − 2)a with the n∗-layer hierarchy, where n is
the number of employees. Consequently, if the cost of processing information is smaller
than the cost of linking a subordinate with the designer (a < λ), the n∗-layer hierarchy
is more cost eﬃcient than the 1-layer hierarchy. This reasoning naturally focuses on the
cost of linking and communicating with the designer and assumes that it is suﬃciently
higher than the cost of linking agents to each other. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
this reasoning is adopted in practice.9
2 Deﬁnitions
The primitives of the model consist of two essential ingredients: social environments
(players, outcomes and preferences) and communication networks.
A social environment E is a tuple  N,A,(Θi,Pi,ui)i∈N  where N := {1,...,n}
is the set of players, A the ﬁnite set of alternatives, and Θi the ﬁnite set of types of
player i ∈ N.10 Let Θ := ×i∈NΘi and Θ−i := ×j∈N\{i}Θj, with generic elements θ
and θ−i, respectively. Each player knows his own type and player i of type θi holds a
probabilistic belief Pi( |θi) over Θ−i. Throughout the paper, we assume Pi(θ−i|θi) > 0
for all (θi,θ−i) ∈ Θ and for all i ∈ N. Each player has a preference relation over
alternatives, which is representable by the type-dependent utility function ui : A×Θ →
R. Players are expected utility maximizers. Three properties of an environment are of
particular importance to our analysis:
• The environment has a common prior if there exists a probability distribution P
on Θ such that Pi(θ−i|θi) is the conditional distribution of θ−i given θi derived
from P. The common prior is independent if P is the product of its marginal
9For instance, since August 2009, the University of Leicester has adopted a new internal organi-
zation, whereby departments are now subordinated to four newly created colleges. Previously, the
departments were directly subordinated to the oﬃce of the Vice-Chancellor. The main rationale
evoked for this change of organization was the need to reduce the burden of communication to the
Vice-Chancellor of the previous and more direct organization.
10In Section 4, we extend our analysis to environments with inﬁnite type spaces.
12distributions.
• The environment has private values if for each player i, his utility function does
not depend on the types θ−i of his opponents.
• The environment has a worst outcome if there exists an alternative a ∈ A such
that for each player i, each type proﬁle θ and each alternative a ∈ A \ {a},
ui(a,θ) < ui(a,θ).
A social choice function f : Θ → A associates with each type proﬁle θ an alternative
f(θ) ∈ A. A social choice function is incentive compatible if for each player i ∈ N, for
each pair of types (θi,θ′









Note that our deﬁnition of a worst outcome is stronger than actually required; it
would be enough to consider an alternative worse than any alternative in the range
of the social choice function we aim to implement. Exchange economies with free
disposal are examples of environments with worst outcome: the zero allocation is a
worst outcome if preferences are strictly monotonic and the social choice function selects
positive vectors of goods. Similarly, in quasi-linear environments, the assumption of a
worst outcome is natural.
A communication network captures the possibilities of communication between
the players and the designer. A communication network is a directed graph with n+1
vertices representing the n players and the designer (henceforth, player 0). There is
a directed edge from player i to player j, denoted ij, if i can send a message to j.
Formally, the network, denoted by N, is deﬁned as a set of edges N ⊆ (N ∪ {0}) ×
(N ∪{0}). We denote C(i) = {j ∈ N ∪{0} : ij ∈ N} the set of players to whom player
i can directly send a message. Similarly, we denote D(i) = {j ∈ N ∪{0} : ji ∈ N} the
set of players who can directly send a message to player i. A directed path in N is a
ﬁnite sequence of vertices (i1,...,im) such that ikik+1 ∈ N for each k = 1,...,m − 1.
A communication network N is strongly m-connected if for each player i ∈ N \ D(0),
there exist m disjoint directed paths (i.e., having no common vertex except i and 0)
from player i to the designer. By convention, the communication network is strongly
n-connected if N \ D(0) = ∅. A network of particular importance is the star network
13N ⋆ with the designer as the center and D(i) = ∅, C(i) = {0} for all player i ∈ N. With
the star network, each player communicates directly and privately with the designer;
the star network is n-connected.
We make the following assumptions on the network throughout the paper. Firstly,
we assume that networks are strongly 1-connected: for each player i ∈ N, there exists
a directed path from i to 0. This assumption ensures that the designer may receive
information from each player. Secondly, we assume that the graph is acyclic, that
is, for each i ∈ N ∪ {0}, there is no path from i to himself. In particular, these
two assumptions imply that C(0) = ∅, i.e., the designer cannot send messages to the
players. In other words, as in the classical model of mechanism design, the designer
does not communicate with the players: he merely collects information and implements
outcomes accordingly.
Now, we describe the interaction between a social environment and a communi-
cation network. The important feature of our model is that players can only send
messages to players they are directly connected to. The interaction (the extensive-
form) unfolds as follows.
• Each player i “reads” the messages he receives from players in D(i). Then, he
sends messages to players in C(i) (he may send diﬀerent messages to diﬀerent
players).
• The designer “reads” the messages he receives from players in D(0) and selects
an alternative.
Note that if N = N ⋆, this corresponds to the classical model where each player commu-
nicates directly and privately with the designer. Acyclicity and strong 1-connectedness
of the graph implies that the interaction as described above gives rise to a well-deﬁned
extensive-form. With acyclicity, the communication rule stating that “a player sends
his messages after having received all his messages” generates a well-deﬁned timing
structure, where each player i is assigned a stage t(i) at which he sends his messages.
This statement is proved in Appendix. For instance, in Figure 3, player 3 can directly
communicate with player 1, but not with player 2 and the designer. In the associated
extensive-form, player 3 communicates ﬁrst with player 1, and after observing player
3’s message, player 1 communicates with the designer. The assumptions of directed
14networks, inactive designer and acyclicity (i.e., each player “speaks” only once) make
our problem of implementation the hardest. Section 4 discusses several extensions. In
particular, we discuss an extension of the model where the designer may send messages








Figure 3: Network N3 and a consistent extensive-form GN3
A mechanism is a pair  (Mij)ij∈N,g  where for each edge ij, Mij is the set of
messages that player i can send to player j, and g : ×i∈D(0)Mi0 → A is the allocation
rule. Note that the allocation rule depends only on the messages the designer can
receive. The next step is to deﬁne the Bayesian game induced by a mechanism, a
communication network and an environment.
Fix an environment  N,A,(Θi,Pi,ui)i∈N , a communication network N and a mech-
anism  (Mij)ij∈N,g . Deﬁne MD(i) := ×j∈D(i)Mji as the set of messages that player i
can receive and MC(i) := ×j∈C(i)Mij as the set of messages that player i can send. A
pure strategy si for player i is a mapping from MD(i) × Θi to MC(i). We denote by Si
the set of player i’s pure strategies and by sij(mD(i),θi) the message player i sends to
player j ∈ C(i) conditional on receiving the messages mD(i) and being of type θi. A
behavioral strategy σi for player i maps MD(i) × Θi to ∆(MC(i)), the set of probability
distributions over MC(i)
11. We denote by Pσ,θ the probability distribution over proﬁles
of messages (i.e., over ×ij∈NMij) induced by the strategy proﬁle σ = (σi)i∈N at state
11We also ﬁnd it convenient to view a behavioral strategy as a measurable mapping from MD(i) ×
15θ. The Bayesian game GN induced by an environment, a mechanism and a network is
deﬁned as follows:
• The set of players is N, the set of player i’s types is Θi and his beliefs are given
by Pi.
• The set of strategies of player i is Si.
• The payoﬀ of player i is his expected utility conditional on his type and given
that the outcomes are selected by the allocation rule g.
Deﬁnition 1 The social choice function f is partially implementable on the commu-
nication network N if there exist a mechanism  (Mij)ij∈N,g  and a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium σ∗ of GN such that for all θ ∈ Θ, g((m∗
i0)i∈D(0)) = f(θ) for all proﬁles of
messages (m∗
i0)i∈D(0) received by the designer in the support of Pσ∗,θ.
Denote FN(E) the set of social choice functions partially implementable on the
communication network N when the environment is E. From the revelation principle,
FN(E) ⊆ FN ⋆(E) for every environment E, and FN ⋆(E) is precisely the set of incen-
tive compatible social choice functions. The aim of this paper is to characterize the
communication networks N for which FN(E) = FN ⋆(E) for every environment E.
3 The main results
This section presents our main results regarding the partial implementation of social
choice functions on communication networks. We introduce our main connectivity
condition. Recall that we consider strongly 1-connected and acyclic networks. An
undirected path in N is a ﬁnite sequence of vertices (i1,...,im) such that for each
k = 1,...,m − 1, either ikik+1 ∈ N or ik+1ik ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 2 The communication network N is weakly 2-connected if for each player
i ∈ N \ D(0), there exist two disjoint undirected paths from player i to the designer.
Θi × Yi to MC(i), where (Yi,Yi,µi) is a probability space independent of types and messages, i.e., a
private randomization device.
16In words, a network is weakly 2-connected if for each player not directly connected to
the designer, there exist two disjoint paths, directed or undirected, from this player to
the designer. For instance, in Figure 4, the network N4 is weakly 2-connected while
the network N ′
4 is not. Note that in both networks, player 2 has a unique directed path
to the designer and therefore, neither network is strongly 2-connected.
Importantly, if a network is not weakly 2-connected, there exists two players, i
and i∗, such that all paths, directed or undirected, from player i to the designer go
through player i∗. As a consequence, for each player j  = i, who has a path (directed or
undirected) to i, all paths (directed or undirected) from j to the designer go through
player i∗. Player i∗ thus “controls” all the possible messages that player i can use
to communicate his private information. Player i∗ even controls the messages of all
players which are connected, directly or indirectly, to player i. For instance, on the
network N ′
4, player 1 controls all messages that player 2 and 3 can send. These simple
observations suggest that there is no hope to implement all incentive compatible social












Figure 4: N4 is weakly 2-connected, N ′
4 is not
3.1 Common independent beliefs and private values
We ﬁrst consider environments with common independent beliefs and private values.
This assumption is common in several applications of the theory of mechanism design,
e.g., auction theory (Krishna (2002)) or contract theory (Salanie (2000)). Our ﬁrst
17result states that any incentive compatible social choice function is implementable on
a network N for all such environments if and only if N is weakly 2-connected.
Theorem 1 For all environments E with common independent beliefs and private val-
ues, FN(E) = FN ⋆(E) if and only if N is weakly 2-connected.
Theorem 1 extends the work of Monderer and Tennenholtz (1999) in several dimen-
sions. Monderer and Tennenholtz consider environments and communication networks
with the following properties: 1) types are independently and identically distributed, 2)
a player’s payoﬀ does not depend on the private information of others (private values),
3) there exists a worst outcome (to abort the protocol) and 4) networks are undirected
and repeated communication is allowed, so that each edge is directed in both ways and
players may get feedback on the messages they sent. With these assumptions, they
show that the 2-connectedness of the communication network is a suﬃcient condition
for the implementation of any incentive compatible social choice function. Firstly, we
show that their result extends to weakly 2-connected directed networks and that this
condition is necessary. This result requires the construction of a substantially more
elaborated protocol (mechanisms and strategies) than the one in Monderer and Ten-
nenholtz (1999). Indeed, their construction relies on the existence of an underlying
directed subgraph that is strongly 2-connected, so that a player can send his encrypted
type on one directed path and the encryption key on the other disjoint directed path.
Unlike Monderer and Tennenholtz, our assumption of weakly 2-connected networks
does not guarantee the existence of two disjoint directed paths from each player to
the designer. Secondly, we show that the crucial assumptions to extend their result
are common independent beliefs and private values. Neither the existence of a worst
outcome nor the possibility of multiple rounds of messages is essential. By contrast,
Theorem 2 below shows that in environments with a worst outcome, there is no need to
assume common and independent beliefs and private values. Moreover, it is important
to note that the mechanism and strategies for Theorem 2 are quite diﬀerent from the
ones for Theorem 1. Indeed, the mechanism and strategies for Theorem 1 do not work
in more general environments.
The intuition for Theorem 1 is as follows. We consider the network N5 in Figure
5 and show how to implement the dictatorial social choice function of player 2. Note
that player 2 has a directed path of communication to the designer (through player 1)
18and two disjoint undirected paths of communication to the designer. However, unlike
the network N2 in Figure 2, there is no player with a directed path to player 2 and two
disjoint directed paths to the designer. This feature is essential and makes the proof of
Theorem 1 quite involved for general weakly 2-connected networks (see the appendix







Figure 5: Communication network N5
As in Section 1.2, there are two alternatives a and b and two types θ and θ′ for
player 2. Player 2 prefers a to b if his type is θ and b to a if his type is θ′. Suppose
that players 1, 3, 4 and 5 share a common prior and believes that player 2’s type is θ
with probability 1/3. The designer aims at implementing the dictatorial social choice
function f∗ of player 2.
An informal description of the strategies to implement f∗ is as follows. Player 3
draws an encoding key y uniformly on [0,1) and sends it to players 2 and 4. Simul-
taneously, player 5 draws another encoding key z uniformly on [0,1) and sends it to
the designer (player 0) and player 4. Then, player 4 encrypts the key y received from
player 3 with the key z received from player 5 to obtain w = (z + y)mod0,1 and sends
w to player 1. Player 2 of type θ (resp., θ′) draws a pseudo-type ˜ x uniformly in [0,1/3)
(resp., [1/3,1)) and sends the encrypted type x = (˜ x + y)mod0,1 to player 1. Thus,
player 1 receives the encrypted type x from player 2 and the modiﬁed key w from
player 4. Lastly, player 1 transfers u = (w − x)mod0,1 to the designer. Let (ˆ u, ˆ z) be
a pair of messages received by the designer. The allocation rule is the following: If
(ˆ z − ˆ u)mod0,1 ∈ [0,1/3), the designer implements a and otherwise, implements b.
If the players follow the prescribed strategies, then w = (z + y)mod0,1 and u =
(w − x)mod0,1 = ((z + y) − (˜ x + y))mod0,1 = (z − ˜ x)mod0,1. The designer thus
receives ˆ u = u = (z − ˜ x)mod0,1 from player 1 and ˆ z = z from player 5. It follows that
19(ˆ z − ˆ u)mod0,1 = ˜ x and the designer correctly learns player 2’s type and implements
the desired social choice function f∗. In particular, all players but player 2 expect the
designer to implement a with probability 1/3 and b with probability 2/3.
We now show that players do not have an incentive to deviate from the prescribed
strategies and focus on player 1. From the point of view of player 1, ˜ x, y and z are
mutually independent and uniformly distributed. It follows that the two messages
(z + y)mod0,1 and (˜ x + y)mod0,1 received by player 1 are independent and uniformly
distributed (see Lemma 2 in Appendix) and convey no information about z and ˜ x.
Suppose that player 1 deviates and sends the message ˆ u to the designer instead of
u = (z − ˜ x)mod0,1. The designer implements the alternative a if (z − ˆ u)mod0,1 ∈
[0,1/3) and b otherwise. Since, conditionally on player 1’s information, z is uniformly
distributed, so is (z− ˆ u)mod0,1 (see again Lemma 2 in Appendix). Accordingly, player
1 expects the designer to implement a with probability 1/3 and b with probability 2/3.
It follows that player 1’s expected payoﬀ does not depend on the message ˆ u he sends
and that player 1 has no incentive to deviate. Similar arguments apply to players 3, 4
and 5. As for player 2, he has no incentive to deviate since f∗ is incentive compatible.
The essential diﬀerence with the simpler example of Section 1.2 is that player 3
does not have two disjoint directed paths of communication to the designer. Thus,
player 3 cannot give an encryption key to player 2 and send this key to the designer,
without player 1 learning both the encryption key and player 2’s encrypted type. This
is precisely at this point that the protocol of Monderer and Tennenholtz fail. The novel
idea is then to let player 4 encrypt the encryption key that player 3 sends to player
2, with the key received from player 5. Accordingly, player 1 receives an encrypted
encryption key from player 4 and therefore, learns nothing about the type of player 2.
The proof of Theorem 1 extends these arguments to any weakly 2-connected net-
works (all proofs are relegated in Appendix).12 In particular, we show that if the
network is strongly 1-connected and weakly 2-connected, then there exists a protocol
such that if all players abide by the protocol, the designer correctly learns the players’
types and no player gets additional information about the types of his opponents. In
the language of computer science, we construct a protocol for the secret transmission
12Note that the protocol (mechanism and strategies) of Monderer and Tennenholtz (1999) for undi-
rected networks do not work in general; there is a need for encrypting encryption keys. Their protocol
works only if the directed network is strongly 2-connected.
20of messages. We then show that the existence of such protocol guarantees the exis-
tence of mechanism and strategies such that players are indiﬀerent between correctly
forwarding the messages they receive or lying. Thus, they indeed have an incentive to
abide by the protocol. In the language of computer science, our protocol is reliable.
Theorem 1 also states that the weak 2-connectedness is a necessary condition to
implement all incentive compatible social choice functions. To get some intuition for
this result, let us consider a simple example. There are two players, 1 and 2, two
alternatives, a and b, and two types, θ and θ′ for each player. Regardless of his type,
player 1 prefers a over b, player 2 of type θ prefers a over b, while player 2 of type θ′
prefers b over a. Consider the social choice function f for which player 2 is dictatorial
and the communication network N6 in Figure 6. The issue with this network, and
more generally with any communication network that is not weakly 2-connected, is
that player 1 controls all the information sent by player 2, and there is no way for the
designer to detect a false report by player 1.
0 1 2
Figure 6: Communication network N6 is strongly 1-connected
Clearly, f is implementable on the star network N ⋆, but not on N6. By contra-
diction, suppose that f is implementable on N6 by the mechanism  M1,M2,g . There
must exist an equilibrium message m1 ∈ M1 such that g(m1) = b. However, regardless
of his type and message received, player 1 has no incentives to send any message m1
with g(m1) = b, so that f cannot be implemented. The proof of Theorem 1 generalizes
this argument to any network that is not weakly 2-connected.
Two further remarks are worth making. Firstly, our encoding technique extends to
environments with continuous type spaces (see Subsection 4.4). Secondly, the strategies
we consider are behavioral strategies. In Subsection 4.2, we prove that our result does
not hold if we restrict ourself to pure equilibria, a frequently used solution concept in
the mechanism design literature.
Before going further, it is worth stressing again that the encoding technique used in
the proof of Theorem 1 is tailored to environments with common independent beliefs
21and does not apply to more general environments (even with private values). See the
example in Section 1.2 for some intuition. With general beliefs, diﬀerent encoding
techniques have to be used: this is the object of the next section.
3.2 Worst outcome
In many concrete applications of the theory of mechanism design, players hold diﬀerent
and correlated beliefs about states of the world either because they have received
diﬀerent signals (information) or on purely subjective grounds. Moreover, the payoﬀ
of a player often depends on the private information of others. For instance, in auction
models, bidders often have diﬀerent information about the value of the goods for sale
(e.g., mineral or oil rights) and the private information of all players inﬂuence the
valuation for the good of each player. To handle these more general beliefs and payoﬀ
functions, we resort to a diﬀerent encoding technique. Our new technique consists in
coding the type of each player such that no information is revealed to the other players,
and if a player does not truthfully forward the messages he receives, the designer detects
it with arbitrarily high probability.
Theorem 2 For all environments E with a worst outcome, FN(E) = FN ⋆(E) if and
only if N is weakly 2-connected.
The main insight provided by Theorem 2 is that assuming a worst outcome allows
to dispense with the assumptions of common independent beliefs and private values.
The intuition for Theorem 2 is as follows. We construct a mechanism such that the
true type of player i is transmitted to the designer, no player j  = i gets information
about the type of player i and a false report by player j is detected with arbitrarily high
probability. Consider again the network N5 and the dictatorial social choice function
of player 2.
An informal description of the strategies is the following. Player 3 sends a large
number of encoding keys, all uniformly and independently drawn from [0,1) to players
2 and 4. Simultaneously, player 5 sends another large number of encoding keys all
uniformly and independently drawn from [0,1) to player 4 and the designer. Player 4
thus receives a large number of keys both from player 3 and from player 5. He adds
them one-by-one (addition is modulo [0,1)) and sends the resulting vector of keys to
22player 1. Simultaneously, player 2 selects at random one of the keys received from
player 3 and encrypts his type with this key. He then substitutes the selected key by
the cypher-type and sends it to player 1 along with all the other keys (without telling
player 1 which hey was used to encrypt his type). Lastly, player 1 received a large
vector of encrypted encryption keys from player 4 and a large vector of encryption
keys and the encrypted type from player 2. Player 1 then subtracts these two vectors
(subtraction is component-wise modulo [0,1)) and forwards the resulting vector to the
designer. The designer can then detect a false report by comparing the two vectors
of messages received from players 1 and 3. Namely, if player 1 truthfully forwards
the message he receives, the two vectors should diﬀer by exactly one component. In
such a case, the designer decodes the type of player 2 according to this component and
implements the appropriate outcome. Otherwise, the designer implements the worst
outcome. By construction, only player 2 knows the key selected to encrypt his type.
Thus, any deviation by players 1, 3, 4 and 5 induces the worst outcome with arbitrarily
high probability: this deters them from lying.
An essential feature of Theorem 2 is the possibility to punish a detected deviation
with a worst outcome. It is worth stressing, however, that our deﬁnition of a worst
outcome is stronger than necessary since it does not depend on the social choice function
we aim to implement. It would be enough to ﬁnd an outcome worse than any outcome
in the range of the social choice function.13
If such a worst outcome does not exist, the main diﬃculty for the designer is the
choice of an appropriate alternative to implement whenever a false report is detected.
A characterization of networks that allow to implement all incentive compatible social
choice functions in all environments is left as an open problem. Yet, we provide suﬃ-
cient conditions in Section 4.1. Naturally, weak 2-connectedness remains a necessary
condition.
13It is also worth noting that Theorem 2 remains true if we consider environments with a bad
outcome, i.e., an outcome a such that ui(f(θ),θ) ≥ ui(a,θ) for all i ∈ N, for all θ ∈ Θ. For
completeness, the proof is in the appendix, Corollary 2.
233.3 Connections with computer science
An essential feature of our results is the use of encryption techniques to secure the
transmission of messages from players to the designer. As already alluded in the
introduction, our work is closely related to the computer science literature on secure
transmission of messages, which we now review. We ﬁrst discuss two important notions
of security, commonly found in the computer science literature.
Message security. Informally, the transmission of a message from a sender A to
a receiver B is reliable if A can communicate with B and no adversary, i.e., a potentially
malicious third party (a hacker), can tamper with the content of the message. The
transmission of a message is secret if no adversary ﬁnds out the content of the message
sent. Information transmission is said to be secure if it is both reliable and secret.
To discuss more precisely the notion of secrecy, let us assume that A and B have a
reliable channel of communication. There are two main approaches to message security
in computer science: cryptographic and information-theoretic security.
A message transmission is cryptographically secure if it is computationally very
hard (typically NP-hard) for an adversary to ﬁnd out the content of the message. This
approach assumes that the adversary is computationally limited, that is, has no more
computational power than a Turing Machine. The reader is referred to the seminal
papers of Diﬃe and Hellman (1976) and Rivest et al., RSA, (1978). In particular,
classical encryption techniques with public and private keys adopt this notion of se-
curity. For instance, the RSA encryption scheme with public keys rests on the idea
that computing two large prime numbers p and q knowing their product n = pq is
computationally very hard.
By contrast, information-theoretic security considers adversaries with unbounded
computational power and requires pieces of communication between A and B, which
may be eavesdropped, to be probabilistically independent of the content of the message.
This concept was originally introduced by Shannon (1949) (see also among others, Shaﬁ
and Goldwasser, 1984, Dolev et al. 1993). A simple method to achieve information-
theoretic security is to map the message m to be sent to a number in, say, {1,...,n},
and to add (modulo n) a uniformly distributed random key X. The encrypted message
(X +m) mod n is then uniformly distributed and independent of m: it can be publicly
disclosed without harming security. The probability of guessing m correctly is 1/n and
24thus can be made arbitrarily small. Our encryption method (Lemma 2) is a continuous
version of this method such that the probability of guessing correctly is zero.
As a game-theoretic model, our work follows the latter approach: the agents we
consider are unboundedly rational players. These are very similar to the Byzantine
adversaries considered in computer science, i.e., malicious players with unbounded
computational power. The key diﬀerence, however, is that rational players respond to
incentives: they do not behave maliciously if it is not optimal for them to do so.
Security in networks. Assume now that the sender A and the receiver B are
some distant nodes in a network, so that there is no secure channel of communication
between them. The natural question is then to characterize the networks, which guar-
antee the secure transmission of messages from A to B in the presence of Byzantine
adversaries. This is the object of the computer science literature on secure transmission
of messages. A seminal contribution is Dolev et al. (1993), who show that if the adver-
sary controls at most t nodes, then (2t+1)-connectedness of the network is a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the secure transmission of messages from A to B. Dolev
et al. assume unicast communication, i.e., a node can send diﬀerent messages to its
neighbors. Alternatively, Franklin and Wright (2000) study broadcast communication:
any message sent by a node is automatically sent to all his neighbors. They show that
(2t + 1)-connectedness is again a necessary and suﬃcient for perfect security.14
Unlike our approach, all these results assume undirected graphs, and crucially use
the possibility of messages going back and forth from the sender to the receiver (re-
peated communication). Dolev et al. (1993) show that in 1-way problems, i.e., if the
information ﬂows only from the sender to the receiver, a suﬃcient and necessary condi-
tion for the secure transmission of messages is the (3t+1)-connectedness of the network.
Considering directed networks, Desmedt and Wang (2002) show how this bound can
be lowered if there are channels of communication from the receiver to the sender.
Namely, they show that if for u ≤ t, there are 2t + 1 − u disjoint directed paths from
the sender to the receiver and u disjoint directed paths from the receiver to the sender
(these u paths are also disjoint from the 2t+ 1 paths from the sender to the receiver),
14Franklin and Wright (2000) also consider a weaker notion of security: security is almost perfect
when the adversary has an arbitrarily small probability of modifying the message content and to
learn the content of the message. They show that (t+1)-connectedness is necessary and suﬃcient for
almost-perfect security (see also Renault and Tomala, 2008).
25then secure transmission of messages is possible.
Our contribution to information security. The above discussion suggests
a reinterpretation of our results in the language of computer science. Starting from
a communication network, a social environment and an incentive compatible social
choice function f, we construct a mechanism, which implements f as a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of the induced game. A necessary condition for this result is the possibility
to construct a communication protocol with the following properties: i) the designer
correctly learns the proﬁle of types, ii) no player gets information beyond his own type,
and iii) no player has an incentive to mis-execute the communication protocol. Part
(ii) correspond to the computer science requirement of secrecy, while parts (i) and (iii)
are the counterparts of reliability.
Before proceeding, it is worth emphasizing that the concept of Bayesian-Nash equi-
librium implies that the adversary is a single potential deviant player. Such adversary
has unbounded computational power, responds to incentives and controls at most one
node (t = 1). Our main results are then reinterpreted as information transmission
against this class of adversaries.
In Theorem 1, we assume common independent belief and private values, and con-
struct a mechanism such that each player forwards the messages he receives, gets the
same expected payoﬀ regardless of the messages he forwards (see Section 1.2 and the
proof of Theorem 1). With this in mind, our implementation problem is rephrased as
the following problem of information transmission:
P1: Characterize the networks for which there exists a communication protocol such
that if all players abide by the protocol, the designer correctly learns the entire proﬁle
of types and no player gets additional information.
In the presence of a worst outcome, the designer has the possibility to punish all
players if he detects a deviation and we construct a protocol such that any tampering
with a message is detected with arbitrarily high probability by the designer (see Section
1.2 and the proof of Theorem 2). The implementation problem gives thus rise to the
following problem of information transmission:
P2: Characterize the networks for which there exists a communication protocol such
that no player gets additional information and if all but at most one player abide by the
protocol, then the designer either correctly learns the entire proﬁle of types or detects
26a deviation with arbitrarily high probability.
Our main contribution to the literature on secure transmission of messages in net-
works is thus to solve problems P1 and P2 for directed graphs and 1-way problems:
the solutions are the weakly-2-connected graphs. Compared with the computer science
literature cited above, our approach through incentives allows to get a much weaker
connectivity requirement. This statement is a by-product of the proofs of our main
results, which are structured as follows. We ﬁrst show that on any weakly-2-connected
graph, there exists a communication protocol such that if all players abide by the
protocol, the designer correctly learns the entire proﬁle of types and no player gets
additional information. Theorem 1 then easily follows: we use the common prior to
make players indiﬀerent between all the messages they may forward.15 The proof of
Theorem 2 uses a multiple key technique, akin to authentication schemes (see, e.g.,
Rabin and Ben-Or (1989)), but requires no prior knowledge of any public or private
key. To the best of our knowledge, this technique is new.
To conclude, let us remark that while consistent with mechanism design theory, the
use of continuous message spaces is unappealing from a computer science perspective.
Yet, Theorem 1 (resp., Theorem 2) remains valid with ﬁnite message spaces, provided
that prior beliefs are rational numbers (resp., that a worst outcome exists).
4 Extensions and Robustness
This section discusses various aspects of our problem and oﬀers some generalizations.
4.1 All environments
We give suﬃcient conditions on the network for implementing all incentive compatible
social choice functions, regardless of the environments.
Theorem 3 If the communication network N is strongly 3-connected, then FN(E) =
FN ⋆(E) for all environments E.
The intuition is the following. Since the network is strongly 3-connected, for each
player i ∈ N \ D(0), there exist three disjoint directed paths from player i ∈ N \ D(0)
15We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this structure of proof.
27to the designer. For each pair of such paths, we construct a “sub-mechanism” such
that any false report of messages is detected with probability 1 and which guarantees
that no information about the type of player i is revealed (the construction is in the
appendix, Lemma 7). A simple “majority” argument then ensures that no player has
an incentive to lie. More precisely, for any unilateral deviation of player j  = i, there is
a pair of path from player i to the designer to which player j does not belong, and no
deviation is detected on that pair of path. The designer can then correctly decode the
type of player i according to the messages received from that pair of paths.
Two further remarks are worth making. Firstly, with this construction, we need
each player to both draw encoding keys and to encode his type with these encoding
keys. Consequently, this technique cannot be used on weakly 2-connected networks as
keys might have to come from other players. Secondly, although there are three paths
of communication from each player to the designer, a classical majority argument does
not work in general. A player must not truthfully reveal his private information on the
three paths. Simply, if a player were to do so, he would change the incentives of other
players to truthfully reveal their own private information.
4.2 Pure equilibria
With the notable exception of Serrano and Vohra (2009), the literature on implemen-
tation in Bayesian environments has entirely focused on the implementation of social
choice functions in pure equilibria (see Jackson (2001) for a survey). By contrast, the
recourse to equilibria in mixed strategies is essential for our results. In eﬀect, to trans-
mit securely their types to the designer, it is essential for the players to encrypt their
types with randomly generated keys (mixing). Although the use of randomly gener-
ated keys seems natural in our context, and indeed used in daily life (internet banking,
online shopping, etc.), we might legitimately wonder whether similar results hold in
environments where only pure equilibria are considered. The next theorem states that
the set of social choice functions partially implementable on N in pure equilibria co-
incides with the set of incentive compatible social choice functions, irrespective of the
utility functions, if and only if every player is directly connected to the designer. There
is a sharp divide between implementation in pure equilibria and mixed equilibria. De-
note F
pure
N (E) the set of social choice functions (partially) implementable on N in pure
28equilibria when the environment is E.
Theorem 4 F
pure
N (E) = F
pure
N ⋆ (E) for all environments E with common independent
beliefs and private values or a worst outcome if and only if each player is directly
connected to the designer i.e., D(0) = N.
The intuition is simple. If player i is not directly connected to the designer and
if the social choice function depends on his type, then he must send an informative
message to at least one other player, say player j. Given his updated beliefs, player
j might then have no incentive to truthfully report his own private information. This
reasoning is valid regardless of how many disjoint paths there are from player i to the
designer.
While intuitive, Theorem 4 has remarkable implications for the topology of com-
munication networks and implementation in pure equilibria. All but one player, say
player 1, might be directly connected to the designer, player 1 might have n−1 disjoint
paths of communication to the designer and yet, there exist incentive compatible so-
cial choice functions, which are not implementable on that network in pure equilibria.
While some theorists might feel uncomfortable with equilibria in mixed strategies, the
mixing through encoding techniques, as considered in this paper, seems quite natural.
4.3 Direct mechanisms
A central feature of our results is the use of encryption technique to secure the trans-
mission of messages from the players to the designer. While the previous section shows
that this is largely inescapable if we want to implement all incentive-compatible social
choice functions, “direct” mechanisms –where players simply announce their types to
their neighbors and forward messages– might suﬃce if we restrict attention to spe-
ciﬁc environments or to some speciﬁc incentive compatible social choice functions. For
instance, consider the set of ex-post incentive compatible social choice functions. A
social choice function f is ex-post incentive compatible if for all i ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ,
ui(f(θ),θ) ≥ ui(f(θ′
i,θ−i),θ) for all θ′
i ∈ Θi.16
16Bergemann and Morris (2005) show that a social choice function is implementable on all type
spaces if and only if it is ex-post incentive compatible.
29Proposition 1 If the communication network N is strongly 3-connected, then any
ex-post incentive compatible social choice function is implementable on N by a direct
mechanism.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is simple. If a social choice function f is ex-post
incentive compatible, then every player has the incentive to truthfully reveal his private
information, even if he were to know the private information of some other players
(e.g., his neighbors). There is therefore no particular need for encryption techniques:
players can simply truthfully report their types on all paths to the designer. In the
computer science terminology, secrecy is not an issue. Yet, it remains the issue of
reliability: players must have the incentive to truthfully forward the messages they
receive. However, with three disjoint directed paths of communication from each player
i ∈ N \ D(0) to the designer, a simple majority argument guarantees that no player
has an incentive to misreport the messages he receives.
Furthermore, it is clear that not all ex-post incentive compatible social choice func-
tions are implementable by direct mechanisms on weakly 2-connected networks, even in
environments with common independent beliefs and private values or a worst outcome.
For a counter-example, we refer the reader to the example in Section 1.2. So, weak
2-connectedness is not a suﬃcient condition.
In some environments, however, some ex-post incentive compatible social choice
functions can be implemented by direct mechanisms, even on strongly 2-connected
networks. We illustrate this possibility with the help of two important economic ex-
amples: a second-price auction and the provision of a public good.
Consider an auction with three bidders, labeled 1, 2, and 3. There is a single object
to be allocated, bidder i values the object at θi, and bidder i’s payoﬀ is θi − xi if he is
allocated the object at price xi and zero, otherwise. Consider the strongly 2-connected
network N7 in Figure 7.
The designer aims at allocating the object to the bidder with the highest valuation
(if there are several such bidders, choose one randomly). A simple and direct mech-
anism to implement the social choice function is as follows. Bidder 3 is required to
truthfully report his valuation θ3 to both bidders 1 and 2. Bidder 1 (resp., bidder 2)
has to truthfully report his valuation θ1 (resp., θ2) along with bidder 3’s valuation θ3
to the designer. Let ((ˆ θ1, ˆ θ1
3),(ˆ θ2, ˆ θ2




Figure 7: Communication network N7
The designer computes the bid-proﬁle (ˆ θ1, ˆ θ2,max(ˆ θ1
3, ˆ θ2
3)) and allocates the object to
the highest bidder and charges a price equal to the second-highest bid: a second-price
auction.
Since a second-price auction implements the eﬃcient allocation in weakly dominant
strategies (on the star network), no bidder has an incentive to misreport his own
valuation, regardless of the reports of the other bidders. We now argue that bidder 1
has no incentive to misreport bidder 3’s valuation. (A symmetric reasoning holds for
bidder 2.) Clearly, if bidder 1 reports ˆ θ1
3 < θ3, he does not aﬀect the outcome since
max(ˆ θ1
3,θ3) = θ3. Alternatively, if bidder 1 reports ˆ θ1
3 > θ3, he does aﬀect the outcome
of the auction. However, this is not a proﬁtable deviation: it not only decreases his
likelihood of winning the object, but also increases the price paid if he wins.
The second example is about the provision of a public good and is adapted from
Bergemann and Morris (2009). Assume that there are three players and that Θi ⊆
[0,1) for each player i ∈ {1,2,3}. The utility to player i is (θi + γ
 
j =i θj)x0 + xi,
where x0 is the level of public good provided and xi the monetary transfer to player i
(γ ≥ 0). The cost of providing the level of public good x0 is (1/2)(x0)2. The designer
aims at implementing the eﬃcient level of public good, i.e., (1 + 2γ)(θ1 + θ2 + θ3), at
the type proﬁle (θ1,θ2,θ3). Again, consider the network N7 in Figure 7. As in the
previous example, the players are required to truthfully report their types along with
any message they might have received. Let ((ˆ θ1, ˆ θ1
3),(ˆ θ2, ˆ θ2
3)) be a proﬁle of messages
received by the designer. The designer then computes the type-proﬁle (ˆ θ1, ˆ θ2, ˆ θ3) with
ˆ θ3 := min(ˆ θ1
3, ˆ θ2
3), produces the level x0 = (1 + 2γ)(ˆ θ1 + ˆ θ2 + ˆ θ3) of public good and
31establishes the transfer xi = −(1 + 2γ)[γˆ θi
 
j =i ˆ θj + (1/2)ˆ θ2
i − 2γ
 
j =i ˆ θj] to each
player i. Note that up to the term (1+2γ)2γ
 
j =i ˆ θj independent of player i’s type, the
transfers are identical to the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves transfers of Bergemann
and Morris (2009). In particular, they guarantee that the social choice function is ex-
post incentive compatible (on the star network). However, and unlike the ﬁrst example,
the mechanism does not implement the social choice function in dominant strategies,
even on the star network (unless γ = 0). Player 1 (resp., player 2) might therefore have
an incentive to misreport his own type, whenever his report of player 3’s type leads
to ˆ θ3 being diﬀerent from player 3’s true type.17 We argue nonetheless that no player
has an incentive to misreport in that example. To do so, we compute the diﬀerence
δ1((ˆ θ1, ˆ θ1
3)|θ) in player 1’s ex-post payoﬀ between a truthful report (θ1,θ3) and the
report (ˆ θ1, ˆ θ1
3) at the type proﬁle θ:





(θ1 − ˆ θ1)
2 + [θ1 + γ(θ2 + θ3 − ˆ θ1) + 2γ](θ3 − ˆ θ3),
with ˆ θ3 := min(ˆ θ1
3,θ3), the minimum between player 1’s report about player 3’s type
and player 2’s (true) report about player 3’s type. Since ˆ θ3 ≤ θ3 and θ ∈ [0,1)3,
δ1((ˆ θ1, ˆ θ1
3)|θ) ≥ 0 for all θ, and thus player 1 has no proﬁtable deviation. A similar
reasoning applies to player 2. As for player 3, he clearly has no proﬁtable deviation
since the social choice function is ex-post incentive compatible.
Both examples generalizes to any number of players provided that the communi-
cation network is strongly 2-connected. Lastly, note that a common feature of both
examples is the existence of a “suﬃcient statistic” to aggregate conﬂicting reports
about player 3’s type, with the additional property that this aggregate statistic deters
players 1 and 2 from lying about player 3’s type. We suspect that this property can
be generalized and leave it as an open issue.
4.4 Continuous type spaces
Many applications of mechanism design theory e.g., contract theory and auction theory,
assume a continuous type space. While we have casted our results in environments with
17Remember that ex-post incentive compatibility guarantees that no player has an incentive to
misreport his own type for all truthful reports of his opponents (but not necessarily for all reports of
his opponents).
32ﬁnite type spaces, they naturally extend to continuous type spaces.18
We now explain how to extend Theorem 1. A key feature of the proof of Theorem 1
is that player i transforms his type θi into a pseudo-type ˜ xi, which reveals his type and
is unconditionally uniformly distributed in [0,1). The pseudo-type is then transmitted
through the network by a communication protocol. It is thus enough to show how to
construct the pseudo-type in the continuous setup. Let each player’s type space Θi be a
subset of [0,1) and let types be independently distributed. Let P be the common prior
and Gi be the cumulative distribution function of the marginal P i over Θi. Assume that
Gi is continuous. The key observation to make is that Gi(θi) is uniformly distributed
on [0,1) and therefore, can be used as a “pseudo-type.” If Gi has atoms, let θ∗
i be an
atom of Gi, i.e., limθi↑θ∗







i Gi(θi). Let ˆ Gi(θ∗
i) be






i)]. Let ˆ Gi(θi) = Gi(θi) if θi is not
an atom. Then, ˆ Gi(θi) is uniformly distributed (unconditionally on θi) and reveals the
value of θi, thus is a valid pseudo-type. The mechanism construction of Theorem 1
then extends verbatim.
As for Theorem 2, it extends straightforwardly to continuous type spaces. In sum,
all our constructions naturally extend to the continuous case.
4.5 Active designer
A salient feature of our model is that the designer is not active in the communication.
However, in some situations, it is natural to assume that the designer can communicate
with the players. For instance, a CEO has the possibility to communicate with his
employees either publicly or privately.
So, let us assume that the designer can communicate with some players, so that
C(0)  = ∅. An important consequence of assuming an active designer is that the network
may then contain cycles. We therefore need to relax the assumption of acyclicity.
Clearly, the conditions of strong 1-connectedness and weak 2-connectedness remain
necessary for the implementation of all incentive compatible social choice functions.
The main insight is that these conditions are also suﬃcient. In other words, our results
extend naturally to networks with cycles.
18Appropriate measurability and integrability assumptions have to be made.
33Theorem 5 For all environments E with common independent beliefs and private val-
ues or with a worst outcome, FN(E) = FN ⋆(E) if and only if N is weakly 2-connected.




Figure 8: Communication network N8
The idea is simply to let the designer play the role of a provider of keys, as in the
proof of Theorem 1 or Theorem 2. To be more speciﬁc, let us consider the transmission
of player 3’s private information in the network N8, when there is a worst outcome.
The designer draws a large number of encoding keys and sends them to player 2. Player
2 forwards the encoding keys to player 3, who selects one key at random and uses it to
encode his type. He then sends the unused keys and the encoded type to player 1, who
should forward this message to the designer. Lastly, the designer compares the vector
of keys he sent to player 2 and the vector of keys he receives from 1, and decodes the
type of player 3 accordingly. As in the proof of Theorem 2, any deviation by player 1
or player 2 is detected with arbitrarily large probability, no information about player
3’s type is revealed and the designer correctly learns the type of player 3.
Finally, let us mention that the assumption of an active designer is important in
generalized principal-agents models (Myerson (1982)), where players also have to take
an action, thus creating a moral hazard problem in addition to the adverse selection
problem. In such models, the designer has to “securely recommend” an action to each
player. We believe that our results extend to this more general framework. Indeed,
if the designer has two disjoint paths of communication to each player (directed or
undirected), then he can follow our protocols to privately and reliably make a recom-
34mendation to each player. A careful analysis of this issue awaits future research.
5 Conclusion
This paper completely characterizes the communication networks for which, in any
environments (utilities and beliefs) with either common independent priors and pri-
vate values, or with a worst outcome, every incentive compatible social choice function
is (partially) implementable. We show that any weakly 2-connected communication
network can replicate the incentive properties of the direct revelation mechanism. Im-
portantly, our constructions couple encryption techniques together with incentives to
secure the transmission of each player’s private information to the designer.
To conclude, we believe that this paper delineates promising avenues for future
research. An interesting open problem is the characterization of networks which are
“equivalent” to the star network N ⋆ for all environments. We already know that the
strong 3-connectedness of the network is suﬃcient, but ﬁnding necessary and suﬃcient
conditions remains an open issue. Another interesting open issue is to consider par-
tially known networks e.g., a model where players only known their neighbors. Other




In this section, we prove that the communication rule stating that “a player sends
his messages after having received all his messages” generates a well-deﬁned timing
structure.
Lemma 1 Let N be a strongly 1-connected and acyclic network. There exists an
integer T and a timing function t : N → {1,...,T} such that t(i) is the stage at
which player i sends his messages. Moreover, ij ∈ N ⇒ t(i) < t(j).
19Renou (2008) is a ﬁrst attempt at characterizing the social choice correspondences fully imple-
mentable in Nash equilibria on communication networks.
35Proof Let V1 = {i ∈ N : D(i) = ∅} be the set of players who cannot receive
messages. This set is clearly non-empty. For otherwise, there exists a cycle in N. If
V1 = N, then N = N ∗ and the proof is complete. If V1  = N, let V2 = {i : i / ∈
V1 andD(i) ⊆ V1}.
Claim 1 If V1  = N, V2 is non-empty.
Proof. Deﬁne W1 = ∪i∈V1C(i) as the set of players the players in V1 can communicate
to. By construction, if j is in W1, D(j) is non-empty and therefore, j / ∈ V1. Consider
then a directed path π of maximal length among the directed paths from a player in W1
to the designer (such a path exists by strong 1-connectedness). Let j be the starting
point of this directed path. We claim that j is in V2. By contradiction, suppose that
there exists k ∈ D(j) with k / ∈ V1. There exists then a directed path from some point
m in V1 to k, denoted τ = m → l →    k → j. It follows that l is in W1 and τπ
contradicts the maximality of π. •
If V1 ∪ V2 = N, the construction ends. If V1 ∪ V2  = N, let
V3 = {i : i / ∈ V1 ∪ V2andD(i) ⊆ V1 ∪ V2}.
We continue this construction by induction. Assume that for some k ≥ 2, the set Vs
has been deﬁned, s ≤ k. If ∪s≤kVs = N, the construction ends. If ∪s≤kVs  = N, let,
Vk+1 = {i : i / ∈ ∪s≤kVs andD(i) ⊆ ∪s≤kVs}.
Claim 2 If ∪s≤kVs  = N, Vk+1 is non-empty.
Proof. Let Wk+1 = {j / ∈ ∪s≤kVs : ∃i ∈ ∪s≤kVs, j ∈ C(i)}. Since ∪s≤kVs  = N,
Wk+1 is non-empty. Consider then a directed path π of maximal length among the
directed paths from a player in Wk+1 to the designer (such a path exists by strong 1-
connectedness). The starting point j of this path is in Vk+1. By contradiction, suppose
that there exists k ∈ D(j), k / ∈ ∪s≤kVs. There exists then a directed path from some
point m in ∪s≤kVs to k. The follower of m on this path is in Wk+1 and this contradicts
the maximality of π. •
The sequence (∪s≤kVs)k is a weakly increasing sequence of sets and is strictly in-
creasing as long as ∪s≤kVs  = N. Since N is ﬁnite, there exists k such that ∪s≤kVs = N.
The timing function is then deﬁned as t(i) = s if i ∈ Vs. ￿
366.2 Probabilistic encryption
We present three important properties about the modular manipulations of real num-
bers in [0,1). For a real number x, we denote ⌊x⌋ the greatest integer less than or
equal to x, and xmod0,1 = x − ⌊x⌋, the fractional part of x. For (x,y) ∈ [0,1) × [0,1),
we denote x ⊕ y = (x + y)mod0,1 and x ⊖ y = (x − y)mod0,1.
Lemma 2 1. For each (x,y) ∈ [0,1)×[0,1), (x⊕y)⊖y = x. More generally, [0,1)
is a commutative group for ⊕.
2. Let Y be a random variable in [0,1) and x ∈ [0,1). If Y is uniformly distributed,
then so are x ⊕ Y and x ⊖ Y .
3. Let X,Y be independent random variables in [0,1). If Y is uniformly distributed,
then so are Z = X ⊕ Y and W = X ⊖ Y . Furthermore, (X,Y,Z) (resp.,
(X,Y,W)) are pairwise-independent.
Proof of Lemma 2. (1) Consider any pair (x,y) ∈ [0,1) × [0,1). If x + y ≤ 1 the
statement is clear. If x+y > 1, (x+y)mod0,1 = x+y−1. Thus (x+y)mod0,1−y = x−1
and (x − 1)mod0,1 = x.
(2) For each z ∈ [0,1), we have
P(x ⊕ Y ≤ z) = P((x + Y ) ≤ z,Y ∈ [0,1 − x]) +





z − x + x if z ≥ x
z + 1 − x − (1 − x) if z < x
= z
Thus, X ⊕ Y is uniformly distributed. Similarly, for each z ∈ [0,1),
P(x ⊖ Y ≤ z) = P(x − Y ≤ z,Y ∈ [0,x]) +





x + 1 − (x + 1 − z) if z ≥ x
z + 0 if z < x
= z
Thus, x ⊖ Y is uniformly distributed.
37(3) We only show that X and Z are independent, the rest being similar. For each
z ∈ [0,1), P(Z ≤ z | X = x) = P(x ⊕ Y ≤ z) = z from (2). ￿
6.3 Information transmission in weakly 2-connected network
In this section, we describe the structure of directed paths in weakly 2-connected
networks and deduce that messages can be secretly transmitted from each player to the
designer. These results are building blocks for the proofs of our main theorems.
Throughout, all networks (directed graphs) are assumed to be acyclic, strongly 1-
connected and weakly 2-connected. Given a (directed) network N, we denote N u the
associated undirected network: ij ∈ N u if and only if ij ∈ N or ji ∈ N.
Our deﬁnition of weakly 2-connected networks is closely related to the deﬁnition of
2-connectedness for undirected graphs. An undirected graph is 2-connected if for each
pair of distinct vertices i and j, there are two disjoint paths from i to j. There are
several equivalent statements for 2-connectedness of undirected graphs and the reader
is referred to Bollob` as (1998, Chap. III.2). For instance, deﬁne a cut-vertex as a
vertex i such that deleting i and all its adjacent edges yields a disconnected graph.
The graph is 2-connected if and only if there is no cut-vertex. Equivalently, for each
distinct vertices i,j and k, there is a path from i to j that does not contain k.
In our model, the designer (player 0) plays a special role, so that the network N is
weakly 2-connected if and only if no player i ∈ N is a cut-vertex of N u. The designer,
however, can be a cut-vertex. In such case, let a block be a maximal 2-connected
subgraph of N u. The undirected network N u is a collection of blocks attached at 0.
See Figure 9 for an example. In the sequel, we assume for simplicity that N u is the
only block, so that N u is 2-connected. (If there are several blocks, all our arguments
remain valid block-by-block.)
In the sequel, we use the letters a, b, etc. to denote nodes (players) in the network.
This must not be confused with alternatives.
We deﬁne a loop, denoted L(a,b), in N as a pair of directed paths with same origin
a and end-point b, and no vertex in common except for the origin a and the end-point
b. The loop L(a2,b2) is a successor of the loop L(a1,b1) if a2 / ∈ L(a1,b1), b2 / ∈ L(a1,b1)
and the intersection L(a1,b1)∩L(a2,b2) is a path which contains at least one edge and
the vertex b1. See Figure 10 for an example.
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Figure 10: L(a2,b2) is a successor of L(a1,b1)
We use the following notation: we write i → k for a directed path (i0 = i,i2,...,iR =
k) from player i to player k and i → k → l for a directed path from i to l through
k, etc. We say that two directed paths (i0 = i,i2,...,iR) and (j0 = i,j2,...,jQ) cross
each other if there exist r∗ and q∗ such that jq∗ = ir∗.
To prove our main results, we use the following decomposition of directed graphs
into successive loops. We assume that there are at least three player (if n = 2, the only
strongly 1-connected and weakly 2-connected network is such that D(0) = N).
Proposition 2 Let n ≥ 3. For each i ∈ N\D(0) and each j ∈ C(i), there exists a
ﬁnite sequence of loops L(a1,b1),...,L(aM,bM) such that:
1. the edge ij belongs to L(a1,b1),
2. for each m = 1,...,M −1, L(am+1,bm+1) is a successor of L(am,bm) and am+1 / ∈
∪q≤mL(aq,bq), and









Figure 11: A sequence of loops
Proof This is trivially true if n = 3. Assume that n ≥ 4. The proof rests on several
lemmatas.
Lemma 3 Let N u be a 2-connected undirected graph. Let A be a non-empty set of
vertices and let b and c two distinct vertices that do not belong to A. There exists
a∗ ∈ A and a path from a∗ to c that has no vertex in (A\{a∗}) ∪ {b}.
Proof. Since N u is 2-connected, for each a ∈ A, there exists a path from a to c that
does not contain b (otherwise, b would be a cut-vertex). This path must leave the set
A to reach c, thus the last point a∗ in A on this path has the desired properties. •
Lemma 4 Let i ∈ N\D(0) and j ∈ C(i), there exists a loop that contains the edge ij.
Proof. Remember that for each player k ∈ N, there exists a directed path from k to
0 by strong 1-connectedness and thus, C(k)  = ∅. Consider a player i ∈ N\D(0) and
j ∈ C(i).
• Case 1. If C(i) contains another player k  = j, then there exists a directed path
from i to 0 through the edge ij and a directed path from i to 0 through the edge
40ik. These paths must cross each other (possibly at 0), thus we have found the
desired loop.
• Case 2. If C(i) = {j}, denote D∞(i) the set of players who have a directed
path to i. From Lemma 3, there exists k ∈ D∞(i) and an undirected path
(k0 = k,k1,...,kR = 0) from k to 0 such that no player kr is in D∞(i) ∪ {i}
for r > 0. If the edge kk1 is directed from k to k1, then choose a directed path
from k1 to 0 to obtain the directed path k → k1 → 0 one the one hand and the
directed path k → i → j → 0 on the other hand. These paths must cross each
other and therefore, deﬁne a loop with origin k. (The ﬁrst crossing point deﬁnes
the end-point of the loop.) The end-point of the loop cannot be in D∞(i) ∪ {i}
since k1 / ∈ D∞(i). It follows that the edge ij is contained in this loop.
If the edge kk1 is directed from k1 to k, then we progress along the path (k1,...,kR)
until we reach a ﬁrst edge krkr+1 directed from kr to kr+1. Such an edge exists
since, thanks to acyclicity, the edge kR−10 is directed from kR−1 to 0. Thus,
there exists a directed path from kr+1 to 0. Consider then the directed path
kr → kr+1 → 0 one the one hand and the directed path kr → k → i → j → 0 on
the other. These paths must cross each other and thus deﬁne a loop with origin
kr. Again, the end-point of the loop cannot be in D∞(i) ∪ {i} since kr / ∈ D∞(i).
It follows that the edge ij is contained in this loop.
•
We now construct the desired sequence of loops. We start with i ∈ N\D(0) and
j ∈ C(i).
First step. Let L(a1,b1) be a loop containing ij and such that t(b1) is maximal
among all loops that contain ij (t( ) is the timing function constructed in Lemma 1).
(Such a loop exists by the above lemma.) If b1 = 0, the construction ends. If b1  = 0, let
c1 ∈ C(b1) and denote d1 and e1 the two predecessors of b1 on each path of L(a1,b1).
The construction then proceeds inductively. Assume that L(a1,b1),...,L(aM,bM) have
been constructed for some M ≥ 1. If bM = 0, the construction ends. If bM  = 0, let
cM ∈ C(bM) and denote dM and eM the two predecessors of bM on each of the two
disjoint directed paths of L(aM,bM).
41For each subset of players N′, let us denote D∞(N′) the set of players j for whom
there exists a directed path from j to some player in N′. Clearly, D∞(N′ ∪ N′′) =
D∞(N′) ∪ D∞(N′′) and D∞(D∞(N′)) = D∞(N′).
Lemma 5 There exists a loop L(aM+1,bM+1) such that aM+1 / ∈ ∪q≤ML(aq,bq)∪D∞(i)
and which contains either the path dM → bM → cM or the path eM → bM → cM.
Furthermore, this loop is disjoint from ∪q≤M−1D∞(L(aq,bq)) ∪ D∞(i).
Proof. From Lemma 3, there exists uM ∈ ∪q≤MD∞(L(aq,bq))∪D∞(i) and an undirected
path (λ0 = uM,λ1,...,λS = 0) from uM to 0 disjoint from (∪q≤MD∞(L(aq,bq)) ∪
D∞(i) ∪ {bM})\{uM}. Assume that uM ∈ D∞(L(aM,bM)). There exists a directed
path from uM to bM which goes either through dM or through eM. Without loss
of generality, assume that this path goes through dM. If the edge uMλ1 is directed
from uM to λ1, then choose a directed path from λ1 to 0 to obtain the directed path
uM → λ1 → 0 on one hand and the directed path uM → dM → bM → cM → 0
on the other hand. These paths must cross each other and therefore, deﬁne a loop
with origin uM. Since λ1 / ∈ ∪q≤MD∞(L(aq,bq)) ∪ D∞(i), the path λ1 → 0 cannot
go through ∪q≤MD∞(L(aq,bq)) ∪ D∞(i), and thus the end-point of the loop is not in
∪q≤MD∞(L(aq,bq))∪D∞(i) either. The path dM → bM → cM is thus contained in the
new loop.
If the edge uMλ1 is directed from λ1 to uM, then we progress along the path
(λ1,...,λS) until we reach a ﬁrst edge λsλs+1 directed from λs to λs+1. There must
exists one such edge, because of the acyclicity of N. Then, there is a directed path
from λs+1 to 0. Consider the directed path λs → λs+1 → 0 one one hand, and the
directed path λs → uM → dM → bM → cM → 0 on the other. These paths must cross
each other and thus deﬁne a loop with origin λs. As before, the end-point of the loop
is not in ∪q≤MD∞(L(aq,bq)) ∪ D∞(i), thus the path dM → bM → cM is contained in
this loop.
Finally, uM cannot be in ∪q≤M−1D∞(L(aq,bq))∪D∞(i). Otherwise, the construction
above provides a loop that would contradict the maximality property of bm, for some
m < M. That is, since t(bM+1) > t(bm), the newly constructed loop would have been
used at an earlier stage of the induction. Similarly, the origin aM+1 of the new loop
cannot be in ∪q≤MD∞(L(aq,bq)) ∪ D∞(i). •
Inductive step. Let L(aM+1,bM+1) be a loop containing dM → bM → cM or eM →
42bM → cM and such that t(bM+1) is maximal among all loops that contain dM → bM →
cM or eM → bM → cM. If bM+1 = 0, the construction ends and otherwise, continues
inductively.
By construction, there is a directed path from bm to bm+1, thus t(bm) < t(bm+1)
from the deﬁnition of the timing structure. It follows that the construction stops after
a ﬁnite number of iterations. This completes the proof. ￿
Proposition 2 is a building block for the construction of a protocol (mechanism
and strategies) that allows player i to secretly send a message to the designer. Let us
summarize our ﬁndings. Proposition 2 has the following implications: For each player
i ∈ N \ D(0) and j ∈ C(i), there exists a ﬁnite sequence of loops (L(am,bm))M
m=1 such
that (i) ij ∈ L(a1,b1), (ii) bM = 0 and (iii) the loop L(am+1,bm+1) is a successor of
the loop L(am,bm), m = 1,...,M − 1, with the additional property that there exists
um ∈ L(am,bm)∩L(am+1,bm+1) such that the directed path from um to bm in L(am,bm)
is part of the directed path from um to bm+1 in L(am+1,bm+1). Moreover, the sequence
of loops deﬁnes a directed path from player i to the designer through all players b1 to
bM−1. To see this, note that player i belongs to the loop L(a1,b1) from player a1 to
player b1 and thus, belongs to one directed path to b1. Similarly, b1 belongs to the loop
L(a2,b2) and thus, has a directed path to b2. Iterating this argument, we construct a
directed path from i to the designer through the players b1 to bM−1. We will use this
directed path to secretly transfer the private information of player i to the designer.
Proposition 3 Let v be a random variable in [0,1) privately known to player i. There
exists a protocol Mi (i.e., a mechanism and a proﬁle of strategies) on N such that
whenever all players follow the prescribed strategies, the designer correctly learns the
value of v. Moreover, the messages received by any player j  = i are probabilistically
independent from v.
Proof If i ∈ D(0), this is straightforward. Fix i ∈ N\D(0) and consider the sequence
of loops constructed in Proposition 2. We divide players into several categories.
- A player who belongs to one loop is active. All other players are inactive. Inactive
players do not send or receive messages (their message sets are singletons). Let us focus
now on active players.
- A player am who is the origin of a loop is a provider.
43- A player bm who is the end-point of a loop is a lock-opener.
- The player um who is the ﬁrst point on the intersection of the two successive loops
L(am,bm) and L(am+1,bm+1) is a lock-closer.
- Other active players are transmitters.
By construction, note that a provider has no active predecessor and exactly two
active successors. A lock-opener, or a lock-closer, has two active predecessors and
one active successor. Transmitters have exactly one active predecessor and one active
successor. Finally, player i is either a transmitter or a provider. For each loop, we label
Left (L) the path that contains the lock-closer and Right (R) the other. The strategies
for active players other than player i are as follows:
• Each transmitter truthfully forwards the message received from his active prede-
cessor to his active successor.
• Each provider am draws an encryption key Xm uniformly in [0,1) and sends it to
its two active successors.
• Each lock-closer um receives two numbers xm and xm+1 from his two predecessors.
He computes zm = xm⊕xm+1 and sends zm to his active successor. Remark that
there is no lock-closer uM+1 in the last loop L(aM,bM).
• Each lock-opener bm (with m < M) receives two numbers xL
m and xR
m from his
left and right predecessors. He computes wm = xL
m ⊖ xR
m and sends wm to his
active successor.
Player i’s strategy is as follows:
• If he is a transmitter, player i receives x1 from his active predecessor and sends
x1 ⊕ v to his active successor.
• If he is a provider, player i sends X1 ⊕ v to his active successor on the left path
and X1 to his active successor on the right path.
See Figure 12 for a heuristic illustration of the strategies.
Firstly, we show that this protocol allows the designer to correctly learn the value
of v. To this end, let us assume that these strategies are eﬀectively played and compute
the messages wm sent by the lock-openers.
44a1 draws X1
a2 draws X2










Figure 12: Providers, lock-closers ⊕ and lock-openers ⊖
The sequence of loops deﬁnes a directed path from player i to the designer. This
path contains all lock-openers (bm) and some lock-closers (um) and is uniquely deﬁned
if player i is a transmitter. If player i is a provider, we choose the only such path
that begins with the left path of the ﬁrst loop. Along this path, let us attach labels to
players. All lock-openers and player i are labeled ⊖ and the lock-closers are labeled ⊕.















This induces a sequence in the alphabet {⊖,⊕}. Let ν(bm) be the number of occurrence
of two consecutive ⊖ appearing in the sequence before bm (including bm). For instance,
in the example above, ν(b1) = 0, ν(b2) = ν(b3) = 1, ν(b4) = 2.




The two messages received by the designer are XM and wM−1.
Consequently, the designer can compute the value v of the private information of player
i, which is XM ⊖ wM−1 if ν(bM−1) is odd and wM−1 ⊖ XM if ν(bM−1) is even.
45Proof. We ﬁrst compute w1 and then proceed by induction. Consider the loop L(a1,b1).
Player i is either on the left path of the loop L(a1,b1) or on the right path of L(a1,b1).




1 and the right path is
i → b1. Player b1 thus receives X2 ⊕ X1 ⊕ v from the left and X1 from the right. It
follows that w1 = (X2 ⊕ X1 ⊕ v) ⊖ X1 = X2 ⊕ v. Note that in this case ν(b1) = 0. See
Figure 13 for an illustration.
In the latter case, the left path is a1 → u1 → b1 and the right path is i⊖ → b
⊖
1 .
Player b1 thus receives X2 ⊕ X1 from the left and X1 ⊕ v from the right. Thus w1 =
(X2 ⊕X1)⊖(X1 ⊕v) = X2 ⊖v. Note that in this case ν(b1) = 1. See Figure 14 for an
illustration. We have thus proved the lemma for m = 1.
⊖ i : X1 ⊕ v
a1 : X1
⊖ ⊕ X2
X2 ⊕ X1 ⊕ v
X2 ⊕ X1 ⊕ v ⊖ X1
Figure 13: w1 with player i on the left path.




X2 ⊕ X1 ⊖ X1 ⊖ v
Figure 14: w1 with player i on the right path.
We proceed now by induction. Let us assume that for some m ≤ M − 1, wm−1 =
(−1)ν(bm−1)v ⊕ Xm and compute wm. Consider the loop L(am,bm). By construction,
46this loop contains bm−1 and um and the left path is the one that contains um. Thus,
bm−1 is either on the left path or on the right path. In the former case, the left




m and the right path is am → bm. Since
there is also the path am+1 → um → bm, the message received by bm from the left is
Xm+1 ⊕ (−1)ν(bm−1)v ⊕ Xm and the message received from the right is Xm. Thus,
wm = (Xm+1 ⊕ (−1)
ν(bm−1)v ⊕ Xm) ⊖ Xm = Xm+1 ⊕ (−1)
ν(bm−1)v.
Remark that in this case ν(bm) = ν(bm−1). See Figure 15 for an illustration.
b⊖
m−1 : wm−1 am : Xm






Figure 15: wm with player bm−1 on the left path




m. Since there is also the path am+1 → um → bm, the message received from
the left is Xm+1 ⊕ Xm and the message received from the right is (−1)ν(bm−1)v ⊕ Xm.
Thus wm = (Xm+1 ⊕ Xm) ⊖ ((−1)ν(bm−1)v) = Xm+1 ⊖ (−1)ν(bm−1)v. Remark that in
this case ν(bm) = ν(bm−1) + 1. See Figure 16 for an illustration.
Finally, consider the last loop L(aM,bM), where bM = 0 is the designer. By con-
struction, this loop does not contain a lock-closer uM+1. One path of this loop goes
through bM−1, i.e., we have aM → bM−1 → bM, and the other is aM → bM. Other
players on this loop are transmitters. The designer thus receives wM−1 from the ﬁrst
path and XM from the other. The proof of the Lemma is thus complete. •
To complete the proof of Proposition 3, we argue that the message received by each
player j  = i is probabilistically independent from v. This is clearly true for inactive
players and for providers. More generally, the only messages that depend on v are
those on the directed path from player i to the designer as constructed above, so the
47b⊖







Figure 16: wm with player bm−1 on the right path
statement clearly holds for players outside of this path. Transmitters on this path
receive messages of the type X ⊕v where X is some random variable independent from
v and uniformly distributed. From Lemma 2 (iii), this is independent from v. The very
same reasoning holds for lock-closers. For lock-openers, this is a consequence of the
above computation: since Xm and Xm+1 are independent and uniformly distributed,
so are the two messages received by bm. ￿
Corollary 1 Let (vi)i∈N be independent random variables such that vi is known to
player i only. There exists a protocol M on N such that, whenever all players abide by
the protocol, the designer correctly learns the value of each vi. Moreover, the messages
received by any player j are probabilistically independent from (vi)i =j.
Proof From Proposition 3, for each player i, there exists a protocol (mechanism and
strategies) Mi such that player i can secretly transfer his private information vi to
the designer without revealing information to the other players. The idea is then to
concatenate all these protocols “in parallel.” That is, each player j plays a role in each
Mi (inactive, provider, lock-closer, lock-opener or transmitter), and should play all the
corresponding roles simultaneously. For instance, if he is transmitter in several Mi’s,
he should forward the corresponding messages on the corresponding links. Moreover,
if a player is a provider in one or several Mi’s, the random draws must be mutually
independent and independent of messages received. ￿
486.4 Proof of Theorem 1: suﬃciency
From Corollary 1, there exists a mechanism and a proﬁle of strategies such that if
all players follow the prescribed strategies, the designer correctly learns the private
information of each player. We now show that, in an environment with common inde-
pendent beliefs and private values, we can indeed provide the players with appropriate
incentives to follow the prescribed strategies. Roughly speaking, we make sure that
each player is indiﬀerent between all the messages he may send. This is done as follows.
Fix an environment E with common independent beliefs and private values and an
incentive compatible social choice function f. Denote P i the marginal distribution of
the common belief P on Θi, i.e., this is the common belief of any player j  = i on
Θi. Without loss of generality, assume that Θi := {1,...,ti,...,Ti} for each player




θi≤t P i(θi), the cumulative distribution function of P i.







(0) = 0). Note that if X is uniformly distributed on [0,1),
the event {X ∈ Πi(ti)} has probability P i(ti).
Part I. We ﬁrst consider the problem of implementing the social choice function f∗
i
for which player i is dictatorial, i.e., for any θi, deﬁne f∗
i (θi) ∈ argmaxa∈A ui(a,θi) and
let f∗
i (θi,θ−i) = f∗
i (θi) for all θ−i. If i ∈ D(0), f∗
i is clearly implementable. Assume
that i / ∈ D(0). We claim that the protocol Mi implies the existence of a mechanism
and strategies such that player i has an incentive to truthfully reveal his type and no
other active player has an incentive to manipulate the transmission of information from
player i to the designer.
The mechanism and strategies are as follows:
• Player i of type ti draws a random number vi uniformly in Πi(ti) and transmits
it to the designer by the protocol Mi.
• All other active players follow the strategies constructed in Mi.
• Let ˆ vi be the message decoded by the designer and denote ˆ θi = ti if ˆ vi ∈ Πi(ti).
(See Lemma 6.) The designer implements the alternative f∗
i (ˆ θi) .
Firstly, observe that the protocol Mi implies that each active player sends a real
number in [0,1). Secondly, observe that the unconditional distribution of vi is the
49uniform distribution on [0,1). To see this, denote X
ti
i a random variable uniformly




i . From Proposition 3, it
follows that the designer correctly learns the type of player i if all players abide by
the protocol Mi, while no player gets additional information about the type of player
i (posterior beliefs are equal to prior beliefs). So, the expected payoﬀ of any active




Thirdly, we show that no active player has an incentive to deviate. This is clearly
true for player i as f∗
i is incentive compatible. Consider player j  = i and suppose that
j is a transmitter in the loop L(am,bm) for m = 2,...,M − 1. There are several cases
to consider.
Case 1. Player j is on the right path of the loop L(am,bm) from player am to player
bm and moves before the lock-closer um−1. Under Mi, he receives the message xm.
Suppose that he deviates and sends the message x′
m. It follows that the designer will
receive the messages (−1)ν(bM−1)(v ⊕ x′
m ⊖ xm) ⊕ XM and XM under the deviation, so
that the decoded message is v ⊕ x′
m ⊖ xm. Since v is uniformly distributed on [0,1),
it follows that the probability that v ⊕ x′
m ⊖ xm is in Πi(ti) is P i(ti), regardless of x′
m
(see Lemma 2(ii)). Player j is thus indiﬀerent between sending xm and x′
m.
Case 2. Player j is on the right path of the loop L(am,bm) from player am to player
bm and moves after the lock-closer um−1, but before the lock-opener bm−1. Under
Mi, player j receives the message xm ⊕ xm−1 from the lock-closer um−1. Suppose
that he deviates and sends the message x′
m. It follows that the designer will receive
the messages (−1)ν(bM−1)(v ⊕ x′
m ⊖ xm ⊖ xm−1) ⊕ XM and XM under the deviation.
Since all random variable are uniformly distributed on [0,1), so are their addition ⊕
or subtraction ⊖ (this follows from Lemma 2) and consequently, player j is indiﬀerent
between sending xm ⊕ xm−1 and x′
m.
Case 3. Player j is on the right path of the loop L(am,bm) from player am to player
bm and moves after the lock-closer um−1 and the lock-opener bm−1. Under Mi, player j
receives the message (−1)ν(bm−1)v⊕xm. Note that j does not learn the value of xm and
believes that it is a realization of Xm. Suppose that he deviates and sends the message
x′
m. It follows that the designer will receive the messages (−1)ν(bM−1)(x′
m ⊖ xm) ⊕ XM
and XM under the deviation. Since Xm and XM are uniformly distributed on [0,1), it
follows yet again that player j evaluates the probability of ˆ vi = x′
m ⊖xm ∈ Πi(ti) to be
P i(ti) and thus, is again indiﬀerent between reporting the truth and deviating.
50Case 4. Player j is on the left path of the loop L(am,bm) from player am to player
bm and moves before the lock-closer um. This case is similar to case 1.
Case 5. Player j is on the left path of the loop L(am,bm) from player am to player
bm and moves after the lock-closer um. In that case, player j also belongs to the right
path of the loop L(am+1,bm+1) and the same arguments as in case 1 apply.
Lastly, a similar reasoning applies if player j is a transmitter in the ﬁrst or last loop.
For instance, if player j is on the right path of the last loop L(aM,bM) and moves before
the lock-closer uM, the same reasoning as in case 1 applies since the designer receives
the message (−1)ν(bM−1)v ⊕ x′
M and XM.
Now, suppose that player j is the provider am in the loop L(am,bm) (m < M) and
suppose that he sends the message xL
m on the left path of the loop and the message
xR
m on the right path. If all other players abide by the strategies, it follows that the
designer receives the messages (−1)ν(bM−1)(v⊕xR
m⊖xL
m)⊕XM and XM. Since v and XM
are uniformly and independently distributed on [0,1), it follows that the probability
that the decoded type ˆ vi is in Πi(ti) is P i(ti) and thus, player j is indiﬀerent between
following the prescribed strategy or deviating.
Similar arguments apply to the lock-closers or lock-openers, so that the prescribed
strategies indeed form a Bayesian equilibrium. To summarize, incentive compatibility
of the social choice function implies that player i has indeed an incentive to abide by
the protocol Mi, while all other active players have no incentive to deviate, since the
protocol guarantees the same expected payoﬀ to each active player other than player
i, regardless of the message he sends.
Part II. Let f be a social choice function implementable on N ⋆, i.e., f is incentive
compatible. To implement f, consider the mechanism and strategies implied by the
protocol M: each player i / ∈ D(0) of type ti draws a random number vi uniformly in
Πi(ti) and transmits it to the designer according to the protocol Mi, while in his role
of an active player in a protocol Mj (j  = i), he follows the prescribed strategy.
From Corollary 1, it follows that the designer learns the true proﬁle of types if all
players abide by this protocol, while no player gets additional information about the
type of his opponents. To complete the proof, note that as in part I, no player has an
incentive to deviate. The expected payoﬀ of a player i is independent of the messages he
sends about his opponents (since the assumption of independent beliefs imply that we
can consider each deviation as above). Incentive compatibility guarantees that player i
51has indeed an incentive to abide by the sub-protocol Mi. The proof of the suﬃciency
part of Theorem 1 is thus complete.
6.5 Proof of Theorem 1: necessity
Now, we prove the “only if” part of Theorem 1. The proof proceeds by contradiction.
We assume that N is not weakly 2-connected and construct an environment with
common independent belief and private values and an incentive compatible social choice
function, which is not implementable on N.
If N is not weakly 2 connected, there exists two distinct players i and i∗ such that all
paths, directed or undirected, from i to the designer go through i∗. As a consequence,
for each player k that has a path to i, directed or undirected, all paths from k to 0 also
go through i∗. This implies that player i∗ is a cut-vertex in the network. In particular,
all information regarding the players k who have a path to i, is controlled by i∗.
Let us now construct the environment and the social choice function. Assume that
all players but player i have a single type and that player i has two types θi and θ′
i.
Let a and b be two alternatives. The utilities are as follows: ui(a,θi) = ui∗(a, ) = 1,
ui(b,θi) = ui∗(b, ) = 0; ui(a,θ′
i) = 0, ui(b,θ′
i) = 1. All other players are indiﬀerent (get
a utility of 0) between a and b. Any other alternative gives a utility of −1 to players
i and i∗ regardless of their types. The common prior is the uniform distribution on
the set of types. The social choice function is the dictatorial social choice function of
player i.
We claim that for every mechanism on N, there is no equilibrium that implements
this social choice function. By contradiction, assume that there exists such an equi-
librium σ. Fix a proﬁle of messages ¯ mi∗ ∈ MD(i∗) for player i∗ in the support of Pθi,σ,
i.e., this is a message compatible with θi and the equilibrium strategies. Consider the
deviation σ′
i∗ for player i∗ which consists in playing σi∗(¯ mi∗) regardless of his type and
messages received.
By construction of the deviation, σi∗(¯ mi∗) is compatible with the messages sent by
players who have no path to player i, i.e.,
suppPθ,σ′
i∗,σ−i∗ ⊆ suppPθi,σ ∀θ ∈ {θi,θ
′
i}.
Since the strategies are assumed to implement f, it follows that the outcome is almost
52surely a under the deviation, regardless of the type of player i. Since player i∗ prefers
a to any other alternative, this deviation is proﬁtable for player i∗.
It is worthwhile to note that weak 2-connectedness is also a necessary condition for
Proposition 3 to hold. Indeed, if i∗ is a cut-vertex, and if the designer learns the type
of player i, then i∗ must learn it as well.
6.6 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of the “only if part” is identical to the previous one and is omitted. We
turn to the “if” part and ﬁx an environment with a worst outcome and an incentive
compatible social choice function f. Without loss of generality, we assume that Θi is a
ﬁnite subset of the open interval (0,1) for each player i ∈ N. In the proof of Theorem 1,
we took advantage of the environment to make players indiﬀerent between any message
they can send. This is not longer possible in environments with correlated beliefs
and/or common values. We thus modify the protocol in such a way that deviations
are detected with arbitrarily high probability by the designer. The threat of the worst
outcome then deters the players from deviating.
Let η be a large integer. We take up the terminology and notations from Proposition
3 and modify the protocol Mi as follows.
• Each transmitter forwards the message received from his active predecessor to
his active successor.
• Each provider am draws an η-vector of keys   Xm = (X1
m,...,Xη
m) whose compo-
nents are independently and uniformly distributed in [0,1) and sends it to its two
active successors.
• Each lock-closer um receives two vectors   xm,   xm+1 from his predecessors. He
computes   zm =   xm  ⊕  xm+1 and sends it to his active successor, where   ⊕ denotes
component-wise addition.
• Each lock-opener bm receives two vectors   xL
m,   xR
m from his predecessors. He
computes   wm =   xL
m  ⊖  xR
m and sends it to his active successor.
Player i behaves as follows (recall that by construction, player i is either a transmitter
or a provider):
53• If he is a transmitter, player i who receives   x1 from his active predecessor draws
uniformly a random integer η∗ in {1,...,η}, and encodes his type θi with the
encoding key x
η∗
1 to obtain the cypher-type y
η∗
1 (i) = θi⊕x
η∗










1) to his active successor.
• If he is a provider, player i draws (uniformly) a random vector   X1 and a random
integer η∗ in {1,...,η} and computes Y
η∗
1 (i) = θi ⊕X
η∗










1) to his Left active successor and   X1
to his Right active successor.
The decision rule of the designer is the following. The designer receives a message
  xR
M from the path aM → bM−1 → bM = 0, and a message   xL
M from the other path of
the last loop aM → bM = 0.
• If the vectors   xL
M,   xR
M diﬀer by exactly one component η∗, the designer decodes








M if ν(bM−1) is odd.
• Otherwise, the designer concludes that there was a deviation.
Note that no player j  = i gains information about θi by this modiﬁed mechanism.
Indeed, player j only observes vectors of uniformly distributed numbers. If all players
abide by the mechanism, then the two vectors received by the designer diﬀer only in the
component η∗, and the designer decodes correctly the type of player i from Lemma 6.
The key argument is that η∗ is the private information of player i. Thus, any deviation
by an active player is bound to change another component with probability at least
1 − 1/η.
Finally the mechanism for implementing f is the following:
• Each player i transmits his type to the designer using the modiﬁed protocol.
• If the designer concludes that there was no deviation, he implements f(ˆ θ1,..., ˆ θn),
where ˆ θi is the decoded type of player i.
• Otherwise, the designer implements the worst outcome.




uj(f(θi),θj,θ−j)Pj(θ−j | θj) := C.










uj(a,θj,θ−j)Pj(θ−j | θj) := D,
where W is an upper bound on player j’s payoﬀ. We have
C − D =
1
η






(uj(f(θi),θj,θ−j) − uj(a,θj,θ−j))Pj(θ−j | θj).
Letting ε = mina =a,θ{ui(a,θ) − ui(a,θ)} > 0, we ﬁnd:
C − D ≥
1
η




Thus, for η large enough, the right-hand side is non-negative and player j has no
incentive to deviate. Lastly, each player i has an incentive to transmit his true type
since f is incentive compatible.
6.7 Detection with probability one
Lemma 7 Let v be a random variable privately known by player i. If the network
is weakly 2-connected, there exists a mechanism Mi on N such that, if all players
abide by the mechanism, then the designer learns the value of v, whereas each player
j  = i receives messages that are probabilistically independent from v. Furthermore, the
designer detects deviations with probability one.
The intuition is as follows. For each integer η, we can devise a test such that any
deviation is detected with probability at least 1−1/η. We may thus ask the players to
pass all such tests.20 There are several ways to construct such a test and we provide a
relatively simple one. We modify our protocol Mi as follows. For simplicity, we assume
that player i is not a provider.
Providers. Each provider am draws two independent inﬁnite sequences (Xm,H
η ,Xm,T
η )η≥1
of independently and identically (i.i.d.) distributed random variables, with uniform
distribution on [0,1) and sends these sequences.
Player i. Independently of his type and of the message he receives, player i draws an
inﬁnite sequence of i.i.d. fair coins cη ∈ {H,T}. Deﬁne (Y H
η ,Y T
η )η≥1 as (Y H
η ,Y T
η ) =
20We thank Sylvain Sorin for suggesting this argument.
55(X1,H
η ⊕θi,X1,T
η ) if cη = H, and (Y H
η ,Y T
η ) = (X1,H
η ,X1,T
η ⊕θi) if cη = T. In words, for
each η, player i chooses according to the toss of a fair coin whether to encode his type
θi with X1,H
η or with X1,T




Other players. The other active players (transmitters, lock-closers and lock-openers)
behave as in the proof of Theorem 2, except that now, vectors are sequences.
The designer. The designer receives two pairs of sequences (xL,H
η ,xL,T
η )η≥1 and (xL,H
η ,xR,T
η )η≥1.
If for each η, it holds true that (xL,H
η = xR,H
η and xL,T
η  = xR,T
η ) or (xL,H




η ), the designer concludes that phase 1 of the test succeeds. Then, if xL,T
η  =
xR,T









if ν(bM−1) is odd. If xL,H
η  = xR,H




M if ν(bM−1) is




M if ν(bM−1) is odd. If all ˆ θ
η
i have the same value ˆ θi, the
designer concludes that phase 2 of the test succeeds, and regards ˆ θi as the correct type
of player i. If the test does not succeed, either in phase 1 or in phase 2, the designer
concludes that there was a deviation.
Under these strategies, the decoded type clearly coincides with the true type. It is
also clear that no player gets information about the message of player i. The sequence
of coins being privately known to player i, each other active player only observes
sequences of i.i.d. uniformly distributed variables. Now, we claim that any deviation
is detected almost surely. Indeed, if some active player j  = i modiﬁes the sequence,
to pass the test in phase 2 he must modify an entry of the double sequence for each
η. But then, to succeed in phase 1, he should modify only the component selected by
player i. Consequently, the probability of passing the test while changing the message
is at most the probability of guessing correctly an inﬁnite sequence of fair coins, which
is 0. Any deviation is thus detected with probability 1.
Corollary 2 If the network is weakly 2-connected and if the environment has a bad
outcome, i.e. an outcome a such that ui(a,θ) ≥ ui(a,θ) for all i ∈ N, for all a ∈ A,
for all θ ∈ Θ, then FN(E) = FN ⋆(E).
The proof consists in adapting the construction of Theorem 2. Using the above lemma,
any deviation brings the bad outcome almost surely and is therefore not proﬁtable.
566.8 Proof of Theorem 4
The “if” part being clear, we prove the “only if” part. Assume that there exists a
player i / ∈ D(0). We construct a proﬁle of utility and an incentive-compatible social
choice function f : Θ → X, which is not implementable on N. The main feature of
our construction is that when player j on a path from player i to the designer learns
the type of player i, he has an incentive to misreport his own type.
Up to a relabeling of players, assume that player 1 / ∈ D(0) and D(1) = ∅, i.e.,
player 1 receives no messages and thus sends his messages at time 1, t(1) = 1.
Fix two alternatives a and b, and consider a social choice function with range {a,b}:
f : ×n
i=1Θi → {a,b}. With each type θi of player i, we associate a number in {0,1},
i.e., we ﬁx an onto mapping ϕi : Θi → {0,1}. The social choice function we construct
depends on types through these numbers only. Moreover, for each player i, there exists
a unique θ0
i ∈ Θi such that ϕi(θ0
i) = 0. Given a type proﬁle (θ1,θ2,...,θn), we denote
S =
 n
j=2ϕj(θj) and S−i = S −ϕi(θi). For convenience of language, we call ϕi(θi) the
pseudo-type of player i.










where α is a ﬁxed integer and 1E is the indicator function on the event E. In words,
when ϕ1(θ1) = 0, f chooses a if a large proportion of players i = 2,...,n are of pseudo-
type 0. When ϕ1(θ1) = 1, f chooses a if a small proportion of players are pseudo-type
0.
Next, we show that for a suitable choice of α, and for a class of utility functions, f
is incentive compatible.
The utility functions. The utilities are as follows. Regardless of his type, player 1
is indiﬀerent between a and b.
Player i = 2,...,n prefers a when he is of pseudo-type 0 and b when he is of pseudo-
type 1. Further, his utility depends on his type and on the pseudo-type of player 1.
The utility function is represented below:
where for each θi, ti(θi),ui(θi),vi(θi),wi(θi) are positive numbers. We ﬁrst show
that f is incentive compatible and therefore, implementable on N ⋆ in pure strategies.
57a b
θi : ϕi(θi) = 0 ti(θi) 0
θi : ϕi(θi) = 1 0 ui(θi)
θ1 : ϕ1(θ1) = 0
a b
θi : ϕi(θi) = 0 vi(θi) 0
θi : ϕi(θi) = 1 0 wi(θi)
θ1 : ϕ1(θ1) = 1
Claim 1. For α = n − 2 and suitable choices of (ti(θi),ui(θi),vi(θi),wi(θi))n
i=2, f
is incentive compatible.
Consider the incentive constraints of player i = 2,...,n. Since f depends on
pseudo-types only, the incentive constraints reduce to the incentive constraints over
pseudo-types. If player i is of type θi such that ϕi(θi) = 0, his expected payoﬀ of
announcing 0 is
ti(θi)Pi(S−i ≤ α,ϕ1(θ1) = 0 | θi) + vi(θi)Pi(S−i > α,ϕ1(θ1) = 1 | θi)
If he announces 1, his expected utility is:
ti(θi)Pi(S−i + 1 ≤ α,ϕ1(θ1) = 0 | θi) + vi(θi)Pi(S−i + 1 > α,ϕ1(θ1) = 1 | θi)
The associated incentive constraint says that the former is no less than the latter. This
amounts to:
ti(θi)Pi(S−i = α,ϕ1(θ1) = 0 | θi) ≥ vi(θi)Pi(S−i = α,ϕ1(θ1) = 1 | θi). (1)
Because of the full-support assumption, both sides are positive and for each θi such
that ϕi(θi) = 0, one can ﬁnd (ti(θi),vi(θi)) such that (1) holds.
Similarly, if player i is of type θi such that ϕi(θi) = 1, his expected payoﬀ of
announcing 1 is:
ui(θi)Pi(S−i + 1 > α,ϕ1(θ1) = 0 | θi) + wi(θi)Pi(S−i + 1 ≤ α,,ϕ1(θ1) = 1 | θi)
If he announces 0, his expected utility is:
ui(θi)Pi(S−i > α,ϕ1(θ1) = 0 | θi) + wi(θi)Pi(S−i + 1 ≤ α,ϕ1(θ1) = 1 | θi)
The associated incentive constraint amounts to:
ui(θi)Pi(S−i = α,ϕ1(θ1) = 0 | θi) ≥ wi(θi)Pi(S−i = α,ϕ1(θ1) = 1 | θi). (2)
58Both sides are positive and for each θi such that ϕi(θi) = 1, one can ﬁnd (ui(θi),wi(θi))
such that (2) holds.
To complete the proof of Theorem 4, we now show that the social choice function
f is not partially implementable on N.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a mechanism (M,g) on N and a pure
strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium s of the induced game such that f = g ◦ s.
Since player 1 receives no messages (D(1) = ∅), the strategy of player 1 of type
θ1 is a tuple of messages s1(θ1) = (m1j(θ1))j∈C(1), where m1j(θ1) is the message that
player 1 sends to player j ∈ C(1) when he is of type θ1.
Note that, for every type proﬁle of the other players, the pseudo-type of player 1
determines the alternative chosen by f: ∀θ−1,
f(0,(ϕj(θj))j =1)  = f(1,(ϕj(θj))j =1).
It follows that the tuple of messages sent by player 1 of type θ1 s.t. ϕ1(θ1) = 0 is
diﬀerent from the tuple of messages sent by player 1 of type θ1 s.t. ϕ1(θ1) = 1. Recall
that there is only one type θ0
1 of player 1 such that ϕ1(θ1) = 0. We thus have,
∀θ1 s.t.ϕ1(θ1) = 1,(m1j(θ
0
1))j∈C(1)  = (m1j(θ1))j∈C(1)
and therefore, for each θ1 such that ϕ1(θ1) = 1, there exists a player i ∈ C(1) for whom
m1i(θ0
1)  = m1i(θ1). We conclude that, for each θ1  = θ0
1, when player 1 is of type θ1,
there exists a player i ∈ C(1) who learns from the messages that player 1’s type is not
θ0
1. In particular, player i learns that the pseudo-type of player 1 is 1. We claim that
this player has an incentive to deviate after receiving a message diﬀerent from m1i(θ0
1).
Claim 2. Player i ∈ C(1), of type θ0
i, receiving a message m1i  = m1i(θ0
1) from
player 1, has an incentive to deviate from s.
Proof. Let us ﬁx θ∗
1 such that ϕ1(θ∗
1) = 1 and a player i ∈ C(1) of type θ0
i, such that
m1i(θ∗
1)  = m1i(θ0
1). Consider also a proﬁle of types (θ∗
k)k =1,k =i such that for each k,
ϕk(θ∗
k) = 1. For this type proﬁle, S−i = n−2. Since f = g ◦s, if player i announces 0,
i.e. plays what s recommends for type θ0
i, then S = n − 2 and y is chosen. If player i
announces 1, i.e. plays what s recommends for a type θi  = θ0
i, then S = n − 1 and x
is chosen. Thus, if player i knew that the pseudo-type is 1 for every other player, he
would have a clear incentive to play as if he were not of type θ0
i.
59Let m∗
i be the tuple of messages received by player i (under s) when the types
of the other players are (θ∗
1,(θ∗
k)k =1,k =i). This tuple of messages occurs with positive
probability. From the above discussion, player i deduces the pseudo-type of player 1
from m∗
i:

















We have thus exhibited a situation (i.e. messages, or an information set in the extensive
game) where player i of type θ0
i knows that ϕ1(θ1) = 1 and inﬂuences the selected
alternative with positive probability. He faces thus the same kind of incentive problem
as in the direct mechanism, except for the beliefs (priors are replaced by posteriors).
The expected utility of player i of type θ0
i, conditional on m∗




















v − v = vi(θ
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This gives the desired contradiction. ￿
6.9 Proof of Theorem 5
The proof is very similar to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. The proof that the con-
dition is necessary is the same. For suﬃciency, the main task is to extend Proposition
3 to weakly 2-connected networks with cycles. Once this is established, Theorem 5
follows, similarly as for Theorems 1 and 2 and this part of the proof is omitted.
We now explain how to extend Proposition 3. A important remark is the follow-
ing. Since the network has cycles, the existence of the timing structure is no longer
guaranteed, in fact it simply fails. To deﬁne a mechanism, one has to specify a timing
60structure, i.e., who speaks ﬁrst, who speaks second, and so on. To avoid this diﬃ-
culty, we associate to the network N, an augmented network N A, which is strongly
1-connected, weakly 2-connected and acyclic. Thus, Proposition 3 holds true on N A.
Then, we show how the protocol on N A induces the desired protocol on N.
Let us ﬁx a strongly 1-connected and weakly 2-connected network N (but not
necessarily acyclic). Recall that a network is a set of edges. A sub-network is thus a
subset of edges.
Lemma 8 There exists an acyclic and strongly 1-connected sub-network N a of N.
Proof. For each i ∈ N, consider a shortest directed path from i to 0 in N. Such a
shortest directed path exists since N is strongly 1-connected. Let N a be the collection
of all these paths. We claim that N a has the required properties. By construction, it
is strongly 1-connected. Let us show that it is acyclic. By contradiction, assume that
N a contains the cycle i1 → i2 → ... → iK → i1. By construction, N a is such that
C(0) = ∅, i.e., there is no edge 0i for some i ∈ N in N a. It follows that the cycle does
not contain the designer (player 0). It then follows that there exists k ∈ {2,...,K}
such that the shortest path from ik to 0 does not follow the cycle (otherwise, 0 cannot
be reached, a contradiction with 1-strong connectedness). Thus, the edge ikik+1 is not
on a shortest path from any player j to 0, contradicting the construction of N a. •
With a slight abuse of notation, let N a be a maximal acyclic and strongly 1-
connected sub-network of N (it exists by the preceding lemma) and let C = N\N a be
the set of edges of N that do not belong to N a. Note that every edge of C belongs to
a cycle of N and that every cycle of N contains an edge in C. Let N A be the network
obtain from N by replacing each edge ij in C by two edges: i(j)i and i(j)j, where i(j)
is a ﬁctitious player who is a duplicate of player i. That is, if ij in C:
i → j is replaced by i ← i(j) → j.
The edges of N a are unchanged. See Figure 17 for an example.
Claim 3 N A is strongly 1-connected, weakly 2-connected and acyclic.
Proof. Each “regular” player i has a directed path to 0 in N a by construction. Since
the ﬁctitious player i(j) is directly connected to i, he also has a path to the designer











Figure 17: A cyclic network N and the associated acyclic N A
transformation. Let us show that N A is acyclic. Assume that N A contains a cycle. By
our construction, each ﬁctitious player has only out-going edges, thus cannot belong to
a cycle. This implies that the cycle was already a cycle in N and therefore, it should
contain an edge which belongs to C. This is a contradiction because edges in C no
longer appear in N A. •
Now, we claim that Proposition 3 extends to strongly 1-connected, weakly 2-
connected networks with cycles. First, on the network N A, for each player i, there
exists a protocol with the desired property by Proposition 3. We assume that each
ﬁctitious player has no type and a constant payoﬀ function. Second, on the network
N, the players can replicate this protocol. The timing of the protocol is the one given
by the timing structure of N A, which is well-deﬁned since N A is acyclic and strongly
1-connected. In particular, each duplicated player i plays only twice: he plays as the
ﬁctitious player i(j) the ﬁrst time and as player i the second time.
Thus, Proposition 3 extends and Theorem 5 follows, similarly as for Theorems 1
and 2.
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